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Abstract 
 
In South Africa, a number of banks have failed since 1990. Governance issues have been 
cited as possible reasons for these failures. The purpose of this study was to understand 
governance disclosures with specific reference to the African Bank. This study analysed 
the disclosures of the governance and regulatory framework that banks must comply with, 
namely, the King III principles and recommendations in the wake of the financial crises 
2007-2008.  
 
An empirical study was conducted to examine the extent to which governance was 
disclosed in African Bank’s last integrated annual report, published in 2014. Data was 
collected and analysed from published summaries and credible websites. A qualitative 
methodology was followed, and secondary data was used to establish the background of 
the research problem. A case study analysis was considered to be most appropriate for 
this study. A self-developed checklist was formulated based on King III; this was 
compared to the governance disclosures of African Bank to determine levels of 
compliance. The results of the study reveal that African Bank did not fully comply with the 
governance disclosures in terms of King III. Its disclosures, therefore, did not mirror the 
reality of the bank. 
Keywords: Governance, board of directors, disclosures, integrated annual report, King 
III. 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
  
1.1 Background to the research problem 
Banks are risk-taking enterprises operating in an increasingly unpredictable and unstable 
business environment. They are required to provide a multitude of information about their 
activities to the public in the form of disclosure in their integrated annual reporting (Githinji, 
2017; Jayaraman & Kothari, 2012; Patson, 2013). The Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(JSE) mandates listed organisations and banks to disclose the extent of their compliance 
with King III or to explain lack of compliance (JSE, 2016). Following the global financial 
crises of 2007-2008, banks are required to recover as quickly as possible to effectively 
contribute to the economic development of the country (Aebi, Sebato & Schmid, 2012). 
In South Africa, a number of banks have failed since 1990, namely, Alpha Bank Limited, 
Cape Investment Bank Limited, Community Bank, Pretoria Bank, Prima Bank Limited and 
Saambou Bank (Tjiane, 2015). It appears that governance issues may have been the 
reasons for these banks’ failure (Sanderson, Mare & De Jongh, 2017). African Bank is 
the most recent bank to experience failure in the banking sector. All entities in South 
Africa operate within a corporate governance framework that consists of various laws and 
regulations including, but not limited to; the Banks Act, Basel, the Companies Act, the 
JSE listing requirements, as well as King III. For the purposes of this study, the narrow 
governance of the King III is considered to be best practice for good corporate governance 
in South Africa as stated by Moloi (2014), and it sets out the disclosures requirements 
that organisation needs to follow in order to comply with the corporate governance 
principles.  At the time of curatorship of African Bank, King III was the applicable 
governance report for South African organisations. Therefore, this study analyses the 
governance disclosures of African bank using the King III principles and 
recommendations. 
In light of the above, African Bank had to comply with the King III requirements. This study 
focuses only on the governance disclosures of African Bank in terms of King III. 
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The most recent in the string of corporate disasters was the fallout of African Bank in 
2014, which at the time was listed on the (JSE) (Sharma, 2014). This occurrence took 
place against a backdrop of significant capital raising in 2013, with detailed radical action 
undertaken by the board management, restricted African Bank emerged from curatorship 
with significant losses imposed on creditors and shareholders (Mare & Sanderson, 2017). 
The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) placed African Bank under curatorship on 10 
August 2014 after the fallout (SARB, 2014). Sharma (2014) states that the collapse of 
African Bank was due to poor management by the board of the African Bank and lack of 
banking supervision by SARB. The bank failed to comply with the National Consumer 
Tribunal (NCT), the National Credit Act (Act 34 of 2005) (NCA), the Companies Act (the 
Act) and King III, and these acts and regulations work within the framework of corporate 
governance. These failings were compounded by the business model of the bank and the 
risk associated with this model as well as the aggressive application of accounting 
practices. African Bank’s impairment practices were aggressive in comparison with the 
banking sector as a whole, African Bank used a seven days emergence period whereas 
the big major banks generally used a 30 days emergence period (SARB, 2016b). The 
SARB (2014) confirmed that African Bank failed to comply with the recommended 
banking practices. The King III principles clearly state that the board must act in the best 
interests of the company by considering short- and long-term strategy. It appears that 
African Bank was unable to meet its short- and long-term strategic goals and needs, and 
thus adopted inadequate accounting practices (SARB, 2016b). 
The failure of African Bank came as a shock to South African financial markets and 
introduced a systemic risk to the South African financial sector system (Mare & 
Sanderson, 2017). This perceived systemic risk was reflected in the losses incurred by 
African Bank for money market funds arising from non-performing loans, which resulted 
in the share price declining from R6.86 to R0.31 per share (Laubscher, 2014).  
Donnelly (2014) and the SARB (2016b) reported that African Bank’s accounting practices 
did not comply with the requirements of International Accounting Standard (IAS39); 
furthermore, the extreme business model was indeed a contributing component to the 
collapse of the bank. Unlike other banks, African Bank did not earn any fees from 
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transactional services such as deposits and investments from customers. African Bank 
relied primarily on providing unsecured lending finance to borrowers (Sharma, 2014). The 
bank’s funding was raised from international markets and lent to borrowers in the form of 
unsecured credit, charging high-interest rates (Donnelly, 2014; Mare & Sanderson, 2017).  
African Bank responded negatively to increased competition in the unsecured market by 
aggressively expanding its lending; however, when tough economic conditions hit lower-
end consumers, non-performing loans soared (SARB, 2016b). It is shown that by 
increasing its unsecured credit facilities to its borrowers, African Bank was in 
contravention of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (Constantos, 
2015 & SARB, 2016b). These principles refer to credit and liquidity risk (Tjiane, 2015) and 
include the principle of effective, sound operational risk management; the principle of 
supervisory independent and accountable resources; and the principle of macro-
prudential supervision and leverage ratio framework and disclosure requirements (Basel 
Committee of Banking Solutions (BCBS), 2015 & van Wyk, 2014).  
Furthermore, African Bank failed to comply with the NCA. According to Singh (2014) and 
Aebi et al. (2012), good governance framework, policies, procedures, processes and 
practices are aimed at improving the financial performance of a bank. Existing empirical 
studies supply evidence that governance framework plays an important role in the 
governance of a banking institution (Beasley, 1996; De Andres & Vallelado, 2008).  
The failure of African Bank brought about significant financial losses, which included a 
penalty fee of over R300 million charged by the NCT, which works together with the NCA 
to curb reckless credit lending. Such losses negatively affected the South African 
economy, liquidity information and transformation (SARB, 2014; Constantos, 2015). A 
study by Awad, Ibrahim and Hegazy (2016) indicates that the governance framework in 
the banking sector has an impact on the economy and failure to apply a proper framework 
can lead to high bank risk exposure and losses that affect the economy.  
The banking sector has undergone considerable changes over the past 11 years from 
2007-2018 as countries no longer operate in isolation, owing to globalisation during 2007-
2008 (Viegi, 2008). According to Thakor (2015), the global and African financial market 
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suffered its fair share of global financial crises caused by, among others, reckless lending, 
poor management and the failure to follow financial regulations requiring disclosure of 
governance frameworks. These now serve as a point of reference and has led to 
increased calls for more extensive corporate governance and regulatory disclosure for 
banks in South Africa (Tjiane, 2015). 
The BCBS and King III had issued an appropriate governance structure which was 
applicable at the time of African Bank’s curatorship and was imperative to the banking 
practice structure following the failures (Cummins, Lewis & Wei 2006; Gillet, Huber & 
Planus 2010). However, this study focuses on the disclosures of African Bank in terms of 
King III. 
1.2 Research statement  
Banks in South Africa are generally well-positioned to contribute to the economic 
development of the country (Aebi et al., 2012). This contribution relies on good 
governance policies disclosure, procedures, processes and practices to ensure the 
soundboard performance of banks (Singh, 2014). Poor board performance affects the 
soundness of the bank, resulting in slow economic growth and development (Awad et al., 
2016). Due to an increased focus on governance disclosure framework, the governance 
disclosures of African Bank will be analysed. 
The study analyses the governance disclosures of African Bank in terms of the King III 
principles and recommendations guidelines. Following the global financial crisis, the 
increased focus on board governance in the banking sector has prompted the researcher 
to conduct a detailed analysis of the impact of governance disclosure framework of the 
African Bank. This type of focus has not yet been identified or explained by other 
researchers. 
1.3  Objectives of the study 
The objectives of this study can be formulated as follows: 
i. To critically evaluate the governance disclosure framework requirements for 
organisations in South Africa; 
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ii. To critically evaluate the compliance disclosure framework requirements for 
South African organisations; and 
iii. To analyse the governance disclosures by African Bank against the 
governance disclosure framework requirement and compliance disclosure 
framework. 
1.4  Significance of the study 
The purpose of this study is to analyse the governance disclosures and recommendations 
framework for the banking sector. This study makes a number of contributions to research 
on governance disclosure based on the recommendations identified in King III. There are 
recommendations which remain in King IV from King III, and they form part of this study. 
Namely; the BoD should lead ethically and efficiently; and the BoD should serve as the 
focal point and custodian of corporate governance.  The outcomes of this research can 
be used to advance governance disclosure practices, for the benefit of decision and 
policymakers as well as small banks in the financial sector. Moreover, the study will add 
to the body of knowledge on governance, particularly in the banking sector. 
1.5  Research methodology and design 
Msweli (2018), Ndou (2016), Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2016) define research 
methodology as follows: “research methodology refers to the adopted method that is 
followed by a set of procedures applicable for a particular study”. A brief overview of the 
research methodology will be provided in this section, with more detail in Chapter 3. 
The research design, data collection methods, population, sampling, data analysis and 
ethical consideration are explained in this section in order to achieve the objective of 
the study. The objective of this study was to analyse the governance disclosure of 
African Bank. A deductive reasoning approach was deemed best-suited to this 
objective. King III was used to analyse the governance disclosures of African Bank. 
King III outlined the governance disclosures required by African Bank. Based on King 
III, a checklist was developed and was used to analyse the disclosure of African Bank 
in its last integrated annual report, published in 2014. The study used secondary data, 
which was obtained from literature by reviewing articles, journals, books and 
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dissertations as well as King III. The banking sector was the population in this study, 
and African Bank was chosen as a unit of analysis because it was the most recent 
bank to experience failure in South Africa. 
A qualitative approach and exploratory design were applied to examine the secondary 
sources to establish the background to the problem and to set the context of the study. 
This study intended to collect data and analyse the governance disclosures; hence, a 
qualitative approach was deemed relevant. Qualitative research is based on the 
measurement of quantity and used to express or explain a specific phenomenon in an 
amount of quantity (Yin, 2014). An exploratory design was used to gain more insight 
into the phenomenon. This was done in the form of a literature review. Primary data 
was collected, and a content analysis was performed on the governance disclosures 
in the banking sector using African Bank as a case study. This method of analysis has 
been used in prior studies (Marx & van Dyk, 2011; Peter & Bagshaw, 2014; Srairi, 
2016; Taskin, 2015) and has produced accurate, consistent, comparable and reliable 
results. Content analysis is a flexible research approach that can be applied to a wide 
variety of texts (Singh, 2014; Yin, 2014; Leedy & Ormrod, 2015). It does not require 
the collection of data from people but uses recorded information from texts that have 
been produced for other purposes. The banking sector was the population in this study, 
and African Bank was chosen as a unit of analysis because it was the most recent 
bank to experience failure in South Africa. 
1.5.1 Analysis of data 
A self-developed checklist was formulated based on King III principles and 
recommendations. This list was selective and did not cover all the governance 
principles because the study only focuses on board governance. The objective of this 
checklist was to analyse the governance disclosure of African Bank. Therefore, only 
principles relating to the BoD were identified that should be disclosed in the integrated 
annual report. The contents of the checklist are presented in the second Table of 
Chapter 2. 
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1.5.2 Ethical considerations 
All ethical protocols were adhered to in this study. No group of individuals or the 
environment under study were harmed in any way, by the collection of data, publication 
or in any other way. 
1.6  Limitations of the study 
The study is limited to the King III requirements and not King IV because King III was still 
applicable at the time of African Bank’s curatorship by the SARB. Another limitation is in 
data collection and analysis, which only focuses on 2014 as this was the last year the 
bank issued an integrated annual report before collapsing.  The study relies on secondary 
data, assuming it is a true reflection of actual events. 
1.7  Chapter layout 
Chapter 1 describes the background to the research, the problem statement, primary and 
secondary objectives of the study, research methodology and the scope and limitations 
of the study. 
Chapter 2 reviews relevant literature, examining opinions and findings on governance 
disclosures.  This is followed by an account of the historical development of the 
conceptual framework for governance disclosures, and King III. The Chapter concludes 
by exploring the governance disclosures, with particular reference to the governance 
disclosures of African Bank.  
Chapter 3 outlines the research methodology approach, research design and the 
research methodology adopted in this study. A self-developed checklist was formulated 
based on the King III guidelines to analyse the governance disclosures of African Bank. 
Chapter 4 discusses the findings and draws conclusions based on the governance 
disclosures of African Bank and contrasts these to what should have been done in terms 
of the recommendations of King III.  
Chapter 5 provides a conclusion, recommendations and avenues of future research. 
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1.8  Conclusion 
Systematic risk has increased in South Africa and remains a challenge within the financial 
system of the country, which then could lead to the failure of banks. These failures are a 
continued risk, not only in South Africa but also worldwide, as evidenced by the 2007-
2008 global financial fallout, when a number of countries experienced such failures.  
This study focuses on governance disclosures, compliance and recommendations in the 
banking sector. The background to the banking sector and governance was discussed in 
this Chapter. A problem statement based on the study and research objectives was 
formulated, namely, the governance disclosure of African Bank in terms of King III. Such 
studies have been found to make a significant contribution towards the South African 
banking sector. To accomplish the objective of the study, an appropriate research 
methodology was selected. Attention was further given to the limitations of the study, the 
ethical considerations and the envisaged contribution of the study to practice. 
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CHAPTER 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1  Introduction 
The previous Chapter provided the background information to the study. The aim of this 
Chapter is to lay a sound conceptual foundation by examining existing literature such as 
articles, textbooks, published reviews, dissertation and other sources with regards to 
governance disclosures. Salkind (2018) and Leedy and Ormrod (2010), concur, defining 
a literature review as research of various sources that are relevant to the study topic. 
Lwoga, Ngulube and Stilwell (2017) assert that the analytical part of a conceptual 
framework is based on the examination of theories related to the study. The study adopts 
the use of agency theory and resource dependence for analysing the governance 
disclosure by the BoD of African Bank. 
In this Chapter, the governance issues are explored concerning the governance 
disclosures requirement framework. Compliance is a key element of governance; an 
organisation cannot have well-structured governance if there is no compliance with 
legislation. Within the framework of governance in South Africa, the elements include the 
Companies Act, the JSE listing requirements (for listed entities) and the principles and 
recommendations of King III. King IV became effective from 1 April 2017 and thus was 
effective after the curatorship of African Bank. One of the differences between King III 
and King IV is the change from the “apply or explain” approach to a “apply and explain” 
approach regarding disclosures of the entity. King IV places more accountability on the 
governing board and does away with the tick box approach (IoDSA, 2016). African Bank 
was chosen for this study because of the far-reaching impact of its collapse. King III was 
used to benchmark African Bank corporate governance practises and disclosures as it 
was the application corporate governance framework at the time of curatorship of the 
bank.  The definition of governance is subsequently discussed below. 
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2.2  Definition of governance 
As a starting point, it must be understood what governance is. There is no universal 
definition of governance, and as a result, definitions are interpreted differently by different 
researchers (Claessens, 2006). The Economic Commission of Africa (ECA) (2007) and 
Awad et al., (2016) argue that in the past, the lack of a proper definition of governance 
has linked organisational failures to poor corporate governance. Work, therefore, still 
needs to be done to formalise a definition of governance. 
According to King III, governance refers to those principles and procedures underlying 
the way in which organisations should be directed and controlled, and originate from the 
division of ownership, control in an organisation and the need to clarify the roles and 
responsibilities of the BoD and the management of the organisation (IoDSA, 2009). The 
idea of good governance has been developed to restore trust in organisations after 
numerous governance failures and scandals eroded the trust of stakeholders (Adams, 
2012). 
Studies by Goodchild and Lubbe (2017), Mohammed (2012), Metric Stream (n.d.), 
Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (IoDSA) (2015), International Compliance 
Association (ICA) (n.d.), KPMG (2015) and Cadbury (1992) define governance as the 
manner in which the board of directors (BoD) establishes its key policies, internal controls, 
and oversight of regulatory issues to ensure that the goals and objectives of the 
organisation are achieved. The proper implementation of governance is required to 
balance the power of members responsible for accountability sustainability (Al-janadi, 
Rahman & Omar, 2012).  
Other studies by authors such as Du Randt (2014) and Singh (2014) define governance 
as an umbrella term that encompasses the BoD, corporate governance, senior 
management and various board subcommittees concerned with maintaining the balance 
between economic and social goals, individuals and the community. The BoD is 
accountable to stakeholders and shareholders for governance through proper 
disclosures. 
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The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) (n.d.) defines governance as a process of combining 
structures applied by the BoD and managing activities to achieve the main organisational 
objectives. Standard 2110 of the IIA specifies that good governance can be achieved by 
the following objectives (IIA, n.d): 
▪ Encouraging a culture of ethics within the organisation; 
▪ Ensuring accountability and safeguarding organisational performance; 
▪ Communicating risk and key policies within proper areas of the organisation; and 
▪ Developing communication channels with the board, internal and external 
stakeholders and management. 
Good governance can be maintained by assessing the organisation’s business 
performance and the performance of directors by using balanced scorecards, risk 
scorecards, operational dashboards and governance processes, which all combine to 
drive corporate governance (IoDSA, 2015). For organisations to fully comply with 
governance, there are certain disclosure requirements that must be met.  
For the purposes of this study, governance is defined as practices implemented and 
exercised by the BoD of the organisation to comply with the oversight of regulatory issues 
for the benefit of the shareholders of the organisation. The benefits of governance are 
discussed below. 
2.2.1 Benefits of governance  
PwC (2016) and Singh (2014) note that King III is regarded as best practice in South 
Africa for the following reasons:  
▪ It ensures commitment to good corporate governance; 
▪ It improves the reliability of integrated annual reports; 
▪ It strengthens the sustainability of the organisation;  
▪ It controls the organisation’s performance;  
▪ It ensures appropriate board composition, which is intended to increase 
effectiveness and efficiency; 
▪ It helps the board to discharge its responsibility;  
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▪ It enhances confidence in the quality of decision-making; and 
▪ It makes it easier to ‘apply rather than explain’ certain principles.  
King III distinguishes between statutory provisions, which are mandatory, and good 
governance practices, which are encouraged but not enforced by legislation. King III 
makes it clear that it is the board's responsibility to override a recommended practice. 
This can be done provided; the board believes that by doing so, it will be in the best 
interests of the organisation (Singh, 2014). 
Governance is the responsibility of all organisations, regardless of size, complexity, 
structure or nature (Al-Shammari & Al-Sultan, 2010). Therefore, it is important for 
organisations to understand the benefits of governance. Good governance encourages 
goodwill and creates confidence in the financial performance of the organisation. A study 
by Ahmed and Hamdan (2015) shows that good governance is linked to maximising profit, 
with fewer capital expenditures and attracting foreign direct investment. Furthermore, 
good governance can assist an organisation to gain momentum for the following reasons 
(IoDSA, 2015): 
▪ The BoD being held responsible for accountability, responsibility, transparency 
and acting with fairness; 
▪ Ensuring that good reporting structures for the organisation as a whole is in place; 
▪ Compelling directors to discharge their responsibilities and acting in the best 
interests of the organisation; 
▪ Improving organisational capabilities and compliance with the code of conduct; if 
the organisation does not have one, it should adopt one; and 
▪ Improving organisational communication channels, engagement with 
stakeholders, shareholders and promoting efficiency. 
The IoDSA (2015) and KPMG (2015) maintain that there is a firm connection between 
good governance and complying with the law. Good governance is linked to the law and 
cannot be detached from it. Directors are required by the Companies Act 2008 to act with 
care, skill, diligence and to fulfil their fiduciary duties, depending on the country in which 
the organisation is based. 
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Given the legal requirement of directors’ duty of skill and care, Stevens (2017) and 
Mupangavanhu (2017) conclude that according to Act, both executive and non-executive 
directors would legally be liable for misrepresentation should they cause an organisation 
to suffer any damages or losses due to their negligence. A memorandum of incorporation 
(MOI) must be signed by all parties, clearly stating that there is a contractual bond 
between the parties in terms of section 76(3) (c) of the Companies Act. When an MOI is 
in place, organisations are likely to succeed (Berger & Bouwman, 2013). 
The purpose of acting with care and skill is to discourage directors from acting negligently 
in a way that may cause harm to the organisation, such as damages and losses (Cassim, 
2013). It also serves to promote transparency and high standards of good governance 
(Bhat, 2013). Considering the above discussion, it is clear that directors have essential 
duties and responsibilities, and may be held liable for any misrepresentation in terms of 
the Act and other legislation (Marx, 2008), should they fail in those duties. Directors 
always need to act with honesty and in good faith (Moloi, 2014). The Act indicates how 
organisations must be managed and how to impose liability on directors who act against 
the law. By fulfilling the duty of care and skill, good governance can be achieved 
(Camilleri, 2015). The definition of good governance is provided below. 
According to the IoDSA (2009), good governance incorporates the creation of appropriate 
structures to check the balance of power of the executive and non-executive directors 
when carrying out their responsibilities. It also assists organisations in applying King III. 
Vo and Nguyen (2014) observe that organisations which practice good governance are 
highly likely to maintain sound organisational performance and manage risk as low as 
possible. 
Aebi et al. (2012) analysed the relationship between risk management and corporate 
governance during a financial crisis using the following variables: chief executive officer 
(CEO) performance, board size and board independence for largest banks in the United 
States of America (USA). The findings showed that when the bank’s chief risk officer 
(CRO) reported directly to the board, the bank’s performance on stock returns and return 
on investment was increased, whereas when the CRO reported to the CEO, the bank 
performed worse during a financial crisis. According to Pathan and Faff (2013), using the 
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same measurement as above, the more diverse the gender representation of the board, 
the better the bank’s performance. 
In a study conducted in the USA using 212 large banks with 1 534 responses, Pathan 
(2009) examined the relationship between risk-taking in the banking sector and board 
structure. The study found that in banks where the majority of shareholders were also 
board members, the risk-taking did not affect the performance of the bank because 
shareholders looked after their own interests and always acted in best interests to 
maintain positive results.  
Afolabi (2015) examined the effectiveness of corporate governance in Nigerian and South 
African organisations, looking at the roles and responsibilities of the board. He also 
examined external factors that affect corporate governance, namely, non-compliance with 
external regulations and ownership structure of listed organisations. The results revealed 
that South African organisations complied with external regulations and compliance 
frameworks, whereas Nigerian organisations were less compliant with external 
regulations and did not use compliance frameworks. In light of these results, it could be 
argued that there is adequate enforcement of corporate governance in South Africa.  
Singh (2014) examined the determinants of board decisions and corporate governance 
in South African entities using the following measurements: industry experience, board 
independence, experience and knowledge. The findings showed that industry experience 
and the independence of directors with no conflict of interest, positively affects entities’ 
performance.  
Brown and Caylor (2006), Khatab, Masood, Zaman, Saleem and Saeed (2010) and Peni 
and Vähämaa (2012) examined the relationship between banks that apply good corporate 
governance processes with higher returns on profit. They measured the stock market 
performance of those banks in the USA in 2008. The results revealed that there is indeed 
a relationship between banks with robust corporate governance structures and higher 
returns on profit. Another result also indicated that stock market valuations were positively 
affected by good governance processes. Peni and Vähämaa (2012) concluded that 
higher returns on profit were influenced by good corporate governance, which prevents 
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potential financial crises in banks. Krishnan, Muliyani and Amin (2017) concur with Vo 
and Nguyen (2014) and Singh (2014) that there is a positive relationship between 
governance, an independent board and the performance of the organisation.  
The results that are reported by the above scholars are consistent with the view that there 
is a significant positive relationship between the application of good governance and 
appropriate board structures, namely; Afolabi, 2015; Aebi et al., 2012; IoDSA, 2009; 
Singh, 2014; Vo & Nguyeni, 2014. Pathan, 2009; and Pathan and Faff, 2013; however, 
disagree, claiming that in the USA, the involvement of majority shareholders as board 
members improves the application of good governance of the organisation because 
shareholders thoroughly evaluate risk before making decisions. Aebi et al., 2012; Brown 
& Caylor 2006; Khatab et al., 2010 and Peni & Vähämaa 2012; reinforce that positive 
performance may be maintained when the CRO reports directly to the board. Jizi, Salama, 
Dixon and Stratling (2013) and Singh (2014) support Krishnan et al. (2017) insofar as 
they assert that corporate governance positively influences performance, although 
different methods were used to analyse the variables. Brown and Caylor (2006) concur 
with Peni and Vähämaa (2012) that high returns are affected by good corporate 
governance.   
As indicated in section 2.1, compliance is a key element of governance; an organisation 
cannot have well-structured governance if there is no compliance with legislation. A 
definition of compliance is discussed below. 
2.3  Definition of compliance 
As a starting point, it is necessary to provide a definition of compliance. ICA (n.d.) and IIA 
(n.d.) define compliance as the ability to act according to a set of rules. According to Mnif 
Sellami and Tahari, (2017) and Mynhardt (2008) compliance works on two levels, the first 
level is to comply with external rules that are set by the regulators in the industry. The 
second level is to comply with systems of controls that are set internally to achieve 
externally imposed rules; this ensures that the organisation complies with relevant laws 
and regulations. Compliance can be achieved by following internal procedures, controls, 
systems and government structures implemented by boards (Edwards & Wolfe, 2004).  
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According to the IoDSA (2009), organisations should disclose in their integrated annual 
financial reports the applicable, non-binding rules, codes and standards to which they 
adhere on a voluntary basis.  
This happens when an organisation deals with multiple regulations contained in different 
acts, regulations and legislation, such as the Act of 2008, JSE, King III and all other 
regulatory bodies, to manage compliance (Lu & Mande, 2014). Each of these regulatory 
frameworks is important, and failure to comply may lead to penalties.  
The Compliance Institute of Southern Africa (CISA, 2011) and the Compliance Institute 
of South Africa (CISA, 2008) define compliance as acting in accordance with an 
organisational philosophy document approved by top management of an organisation. 
This document confirms the authority of the compliance function and provides 
management with evidence of compliance. The CISA (2011) document clearly sets out 
what needs to be complied with, the compliance principles, a written policy stipulating the 
organisation’s commitment and approach to compliance and what is expected of an 
organisation, its staff, directors and stakeholders.  
For the purposes of this study, compliance is defined as regulatory requirements that 
organisations must comply with. These regulations are imposed by internal and external 
bodies, as set out by relevant legislation such as the Act, the JSE listing and King III. The 
objective is to maintain stability in specific environments by establishing guidelines that 
need to be followed, which ensure compliance. Discussed below are the benefits of 
complying with regulations. 
2.3.1 Benefits of compliance 
King III emphasises the importance of the disclosure of governance and compliance. The 
JSE listing requirements set out the declaration of interest and the duties and 
responsibilities of directors which directors must comply with to achieve the organisation’s 
objectives.  The Banks Act 94 of 1990 (hereafter ‘Banks Act’) contains Regulation 47 
according to which it is mandatory for all South African banks and foreign banks to 
establish a compliance function (SARB, 2016a). The two reasons for compliance are that 
(i) organisations are required by law to comply, and (ii) it is good business practice.  
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Compliance has the following benefits (Mynhardt, 2008; CISA, 2011): 
▪ Minimises the impact of reputational risk; 
▪ Minimises regulatory risk; 
▪ Monitors compliance with relevant legislation; and 
▪ Enforces a compliance culture. 
The following are examples of studies conducted on compliance by organisations. Okaro, 
Okafor, Ogbodo and Nkamnebe (2015) examined compliance with the best practices of 
corporate governance in Nigeria for listed organisations on the stock exchange, with the 
practical emphasis on board independence, diligence, size and audit committee. 
Benchmarking with the section code of corporate governance of 2011 that all listed 
organisations must comply with. Namely; ensuring the highest standard of transparency, 
accountability and good corporate governance practices. Based on a sample of the 
annual financial statements of 84 organisations, the findings showed that approximately 
80% of the organisations were complying with the best practice of corporate governance 
and are as follows; to facilitate sound corporate practices and behaviour, defining 
minimum standards of corporate governance as expected from public organisations 
which are listed on the securities, apply certain codes only if not in conflict with other 
codes, and the responsibility of compliance lies with the BoD within the listed 
organisations. Compliance was also in the following aspects: the board size standard, 
independence of the board, the average size of the audit committee of which the majority 
of the members should be non-executive and the regularity of meetings held by the board. 
Okaro et al. (2015) state that compliance promotes the use of internal controls and 
regulatory bodies expected from the business operation. 
Erdinç and Gurov (2016) investigated the application of the advanced risk management 
approach (ARMA) in European banks to find out whether they are complying with internal 
ratings (IR). According to the Basel Accord, the aim is to reduce loans that are not 
performing well and to determine whether European banks complied with the credit risk 
management rule between 2000 and 2011. The results revealed that there was a 
deviation in applying ARMA; however, the findings did confirm that applying ARMA in the 
banking sector reduced the number of loans that were not performing well during a 
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financial crisis period. In conclusion, European banks were complying with the ARMA, 
and for this reason, profitability was expected to increase. 
Carretta, Farina and Schwizer (2010) assessed the effectiveness of bank board 
compliance with regulations associated with the operation of the business in the USA. 
Their results present the following. Firstly; when acting in the best interests of the 
organisation, there should be transparency which should be observable to outsiders. 
Secondly; directors should have appropriate knowledge, skills, experience, qualifications, 
and they should be free of any conflict of interest. Lastly; the declaration of interest clearly 
states that should liabilities arise due to the negligence of directors; the directors should 
be held accountable for misconduct.  
Carretta et al., (2010) reveal that BoD members need to possess personal characteristics 
such as integrity, honesty and transparency to improve the performance of both the board 
and the organisation. The board should propose assessments to be conducted annually 
to ensure that the independence of the directors’ objectivity is not impaired. The chairman 
of the board or appointed external independent reviewer must conduct this assessment 
with directors. The Act extensively discusses the conduct of the BoD by emphasising 
transparency.  
Scholtz (2014) evaluated the compliance of corporate governance in organisations listed 
on the Alternative Stock Exchange in South Africa (ASESA). By reviewing the disclosure 
on integrated annual reporting to establish whether these organisations complied with 
King III and the JSE listing requirements by using the following variables: BoD, the audit 
committee, governance of risk, information technology and internal audit section. The 
results indicated that there was a substantial variation in rates of disclosure of information 
in their integrated annual reports. Scholtz (2014) noted that conformance with the King III 
recommendations has increased over time, 47% in 2009 to 52% in 2010 and 58% in 2011. 
The ASESA organisations received a high level of disclosure on the statement of 
compliance with King III report, BoD and integrated reporting.  
Lu and Mande (2014) examined the compliance of banks in the USA, with disclosure of 
fair value adjustments, assessing factors that influenced boards’ non-compliance with 
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recently updated accounting standards by the Financial Accounting Service Board 
(FASB) in 2010. This was to comply with the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) in the first quarter of 2009. Accounting standards are used for the preparation and 
presentation of financial statements (Gaie-Booysen, 2016; Samkin, 1996). The purpose 
of accounting standards is to ensure the diversity of accounting policies and principles. 
The aim is to ensure that there is a comparability of financial statements worldwide. The 
standards are drafted by the International Accounting Standard Committee (IASC) (Klink, 
2016; Samkin, 1996;). The FASB is a private, independent, non-profit organisation that is 
responsible for establishing accounting and financial reporting standards for the benefit 
of for-profit and non-profit organisations worldwide. These standards follow the Generally 
Acceptable Accounting Practices (GAAP) (Beckman, 2016). The FASB was formally 
established in 1973 in the USA, to succeed in the accounting principles board (Yang & 
Aquilino, 2017). Data was analysed using logic regression. The results showed that about 
23% of the banks were not complying with the FASB Standards on fair value adjustment. 
This was due to the absence of internal controls and the review of internal controls being 
performed by less experienced auditors. 
Mnif, Sellami and Tahari (2017) investigated the level of compliance in accounting 
disclosure to analyse compliance with FASB standards for 38 Islamic banks from Bahrain 
in the Middle East to Northern Africa. The findings showed that the level of compliance in 
accounting disclosure differed from country to country. Another result showed that listing 
requirements and the presence of an audit committee enhanced compliance with the 
accounting disclosure standards. 
Compliance function provides a focal point for compliance within the organisation, and its 
role is multifunctional. Complying with regulations is part of compliance. One of the 
regulations that banks must comply with in South Africa is the Act and JSE listing 
requirements, which are not discussed in detail in this study as highlighted in section 2.1. 
Part of the listing requirements requires organisations to adhere to the principles and 
recommendations of King III. King III is not just a compliance issue for organisations listed 
on the JSE; it also encourages organisations in South Africa to comply with the 
requirements (IoDSA, 2009). King III will subsequently be discussed below in detail.  
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2.3.2 King Reports on Corporate Governance 
In 1994, the King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (King I) was issued 
by the King Committee (Cadbury, 1992; IoDSA, 2009 & Singh, 2014). This report intended 
to deliver practical guidance for policymakers in both private and public organisations to 
develop a regulatory framework of corporate governance. The second King Report was 
introduced in 2002 for directors and organisations to apply, with the code of good 
governance on a voluntary basis. This was followed by King III, which came into effect on 
1 March 2010. According to the IoDSA (2009), King III complements the Act by assisting 
organisations to apply the principles of good governance, namely: 
▪ Fairness; 
▪ Accountability; 
▪ Responsibility; 
▪ Reliability 
▪ Discipline; and 
▪ Independence and transparency. 
According to the IoDSA (2009), irrespective of whether the board chooses to apply these 
principles, or other practices, it must nonetheless ultimately achieve the objectives of 
good corporate governance. The board must still explain how these principles have been 
applied, and if they have not been applied, there must be a justification for not applying 
them. The purpose of the principle is to promote a higher standard of corporate 
governance in South Africa and to encourage directors to act responsibly when managing 
organisations (Singh, 2014).  
It is important to note that King III encompasses social, environmental and economic 
issues and uses an integrated approach to corporate governance to recognise 
stakeholders in an organisation (Elms et al., 2015). According to the Act, principles and 
practices of corporate governance are vested in directors to act in the best interests of 
both internal and external stakeholders when making decisions on behalf of the 
organisation (Moloi, 2014).  
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Furthermore, organisations issue integrated reports with the aim of increasing the level 
of trust with their stakeholders by showing the sustainability of the organisation (IoDSA, 
2009; Ally, 2016). It is the duty of the BoD to increase the level of trust to shareholders 
and stakeholders by issuing an integrated annual report that is relevant, reliable and 
accurate. According to King III, shareholders contribute capital which is given to the BoD 
to utilise for business purposes. At the end of each accounting period, the BoD must 
render an explanation at the annual general meeting on how financial resources were 
utilised (IoDSA, 2015). The following section discusses the BoD and the pivotal role it 
plays within the organisation. 
2.3.3 Board of directors 
The main purpose of the BoD is to ensure the organisation’s prosperity by collectively 
directing its affairs, complying with regulatory frameworks and meeting the demands of 
shareholders and stakeholders. For example, compliance with the Act does not 
necessarily mean compliance with King III and vice versa, however, certain topics are 
explained more extensively in either the Act or King III (PwC, 2011). A comparison 
between the Act and King III will be made pertaining to the BoD in the following section. 
With the BoD, both the Act and King III acknowledge the importance of appointing a board 
to administer the organisation (PwC, 2011). In contrast to the Act, however, King III 
provides a comprehensive explanation of the roles and responsibilities of the board. It 
emphasises that the board should act as the custodian of corporate governance by 
providing effective, ethical leadership (see section 2.3.4.1) (Singh, 2014; PwC, 2011).  
The Act is in line with the JSE listing requirements, as it sets out the procedures for 
appointing, electing and re-electing and removing directors as well as filling vacancies 
(JSE, 2016). The Act also prescribes which candidates are eligible for appointment or are 
disqualified from serving as directors (Moyo, 2010). King III discusses qualities needed 
for a candidate to be appointed as the board member; for example, directors should be 
inducted properly so that they can be legally bound by the Act. In light of the above, the 
Act and King III encompass similar references to the standard conduct of being appointed 
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as a director. The BoD provides advisory services on corporate governance which entails 
the following for organisations (IoDSA,2013): 
▪ Advising on the best practice in accordance with corporate governance code and 
industry norms and standards; 
▪ Advising on establishing and maintaining ethics and related frameworks; 
▪ Advising on the drafting of charters, mandates and policies; and 
▪ Developing tools and guidelines on any corporate governance issues. 
According to King III, the BoD must provide effective leadership to the organisation to 
ensure effective management of its ethics, accountability for the governance of risk, 
compliance with applicable laws, codes and standards, integrity of the organisation’s 
reporting, effectiveness of internal controls, business rescue, official processes of 
appointing directors, ongoing training of directors, qualified company secretary and the 
separation between the roles of CEO and chairman of the board (Elms, Nicholson & 
Pugliese, 2015). 
The IoDSA (2009) recommends that there should be measures to improve board-level 
governance in banks. For example, the Banks Act contains guidelines which refer to the 
Act, JSE listing requirements and King III on board composition and expertise as well as 
an assessment of its functionality. 
The BoD have certain roles and responsibilities under the Act. In terms of the Act, 
directors are compelled by the MOI to express any declaration of interest and that they 
will be held personally liable for misrepresenting the organisation (see section 2.3.2). The 
BoD members have a responsibility to act honestly, exercise reasonable care and skill 
and to understand their duties while acting on behalf of the organisation. These roles are 
discussed below. 
2.3.4 Roles and responsibilities of the board 
 King III states that the board and its directors must act as the principal upholder of 
governance. Furthermore, directors are required to act in the best interests of the 
organisation (Moyo, 2010). It is the responsibility of the board to prepare an organisational 
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charter, which must specify the roles and responsibilities of the directors, the ethical 
conduct of directors and the need for directors to comply with internal policies (Marx, 
2008; IoDSA, 2009). 
Othman and Rahman (2014) assert that in King III, corporate governance is associated 
with leadership because it is linked to the governance of the organisation. It is described 
as being efficient, responsible, transparent and accountable. Organisations should 
disclose in their integrated annual reports how they complied with the requirement of 
ethical performance (IoDSA, 2009; PwC, 2013). Responsible leaders demonstrate good 
corporate governance practices by complying with internal and external policies within 
the organisation (Moloi, 2014). To do so, however, directors need to know what is 
expected of them when carrying out their duties (Srairi, 2016). To ensure the adequacy 
of guidance, they must be properly inducted and must have the appropriate skills (Afolabi, 
2015; Fung, 2014). Directors are legally bound to comply with the Act (see section 2.3.2) 
and to act in the best interests of the organisation (Prettirajh, 2017). The board and 
executive officers of the organisation should establish and maintain an adequate and 
effective process of corporate governance in line with complexity and activities 
concerning the bank (SARB, 2016a). 
According to King III, the board should elect a chairman who can provide the necessary 
direction for an effective board. The chairman should be reappointed each year, and it is 
the responsibility of the board to monitor the independence (IoDSA, 2009). Any 
impairments to independence will affect the continuity of the chairman (IoDSA, 2009).  
The duties of the chairman will be discussed separately in section 2.5. 
Another function of the board is to evaluate the risk management strategy proposed by 
the organisation and to ensure that the sustainability of the organisation is maintained. 
These functions of the board include approving the short- and long-term strategy and 
providing monitoring mechanisms to ensure that the strategies sustain the business. The 
board must comment on the strategy and identify any risk that has not been identified by 
management (PwC, 2013). 
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The BoD is appointed by shareholders and endowed with responsibility for the operations 
of the organisation. In light of the above, shareholders can be seen as ‘principals’ while 
directors are ‘agents’ from an agency theory perspective. This theory is discussed in 
greater depth below.  
2.4 Agency theory 
Agency theory refers to the relationship between shareholders and directors. This 
relationship occurs when principals hire agents and delegate certain duties to them. The 
purpose of the agency theory is to resolve the conflict of interest that may arise between 
the principal and agent (Business Finance, 2011). Agency theory connects literature to 
board composition and the performance of an organisation. 
2.4.1  Board composition and agency theory 
The agency theory relates to the monitoring of the organisational performance of the 
board. According to Fama and Jensen (1983), Moloi (2014), Prettirajh (2017) and Singh, 
(2014), this theory predicts that there may be a possible conflict of interest resulting from 
the separation of duties between shareholders and directors (Lynall, Golden & Hillman, 
2003; Zogning, 2017). The separation gives directors an opportunity to exercise 
managerial skills and maximise wealth at the expense of the organisation. Furthermore, 
the agency theory provides board members with the power to monitor the management 
or directors and resolve any issues by protecting shareholders’ interest (Boyd, 1990; 
Eisenhardt, 1989 & Moyo, 2010). According to the Act, directors are obliged to comply 
with the Act and are expected to perform their duties with due diligence by acting in the 
best interests of the organisation. In cases where directors act for personal gain at the 
expense of the organisation, the agency cost will arise (Nicholson & Kiel, 2007).  
Other governance theories confirm that monitoring is not the only role played by a board. 
Boards can influence organisational performance by providing the following, giving 
strategic advice, assisting directors in developing managerial capabilities, creating 
valuable resources and managing the organisation during times of crisis (Daily, Dan & 
Dalton, 2018). 
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2.4.2  Board composition and resource dependence theory 
Nicholson and Kiel (2007) point out that the function of the board is to provide resources 
to minimise non-compliance issues between the organisation and the regulatory 
compliance bodies. When organisations appoint individuals to act as a BoD, directors are 
expected to offer advice and services as a communication channel between internal and 
external stakeholders. Non- executive directors are an example of external stakeholders. 
Resource dependence theory holds that non-executive directors do not have the time nor 
proficiency in performing their duties exceptionally well (Singh, 2014). Another view is that 
objectivity and independence are impaired because CEOs are responsible for 
recruitment, selection and retention of directors (Adam & Mehran, 2012). The CEO is 
further responsible for disclosing any information about the organisation to the board 
(Fung, 2014; Yusoff & Alhaji, 2012). In light of the above, the board is responsible for 
ensuring that the independence of directors, as well as their diversity and functionality, 
comply with the principles set out in King III (PwC, 2016). The composition of the board 
thus contributes to the success of the organisation. 
2.4.3 Composition of the board 
The board must consist of more non-executive directors than executive directors. This is 
to ensure the independence of the directors, reduce the chances of possible conflicts of 
interest and promote objectivity (Elms, Nicholson & Pugliese, 2015). In determining the 
number of individuals who need to be appointed as directors in an organisation, 
individuals must possess relevant experience, skills and knowledge pertaining to the 
director position (Elms et al., 2015). This information should be disclosed in the 
organisation's integrated annual report (PwC, 2012). In addition, there should be a proper 
balance of power between directors so that no individual director can control or influence 
the board’s decision-making (Oosthuizen & Lahner, 2016). 
King III states that directors must be independent in character and judgement, with no 
relationship whatsoever with the organisation other than their position as director. They 
must not have a direct or indirect interest in the organisation, including the parent 
company of the organisation or its subsidiaries (Moloi, 2014). The chairman must 
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evaluate the independence of non-executive directors every year (Scarborough, Haynie 
& Shook, 2010). The chairman must also put in place a rotation programme for non-
executive directors and evaluate the level of independence every year. Non-executive 
directors serving more than nine years must be subject to a rigorous review of their 
independence and performance by the board to ensure that the objectives of the 
organisation are achieved (PwC, 2012). At least one-third of non-executive directors must 
rotate every year. After the evaluation of directors has been successfully performed, the 
assessment results must be disclosed in the organisation’s integrated annual report. The 
aim of the assessment is to ensure that directors perform their duties with honesty and 
act in the best interests of the organisation. It also ensures that directors are free from 
conflict of interest, in accordance with the Act. 
Adams (2012) and Iturralde, Maseda, Arosa and Garcia-Ramos (2016) argue that 
financial institutions, particularly those in the banking sector, must accord greater weight 
to independence over experience and qualifications when appointing non-executive 
directors as this could contribute to a financial crisis. After the global financial crisis of 
2007-2008, the roles and responsibilities of directors and the value they brought to an 
organisation were questioned (Hahn & Lasfer, 2011). Adams (2012) further raises the 
question as to whether the BoD should be held liable for a financial crisis. Doorga (n.d.) 
and PwC (2013) conclude that the blame for the financial crisis from 2007-2008 should 
be placed on the shoulders of the board, particularly on non-executive directors. This is 
because they failed to monitor and allow the organisation to take extreme risks. The 
purpose of the board composition to ensure that directors perform their roles and 
responsibilities as recommended (Hahn & Lasfer, 2011). 
Kouki and Guizani (2015) claim that non-executive directors exert a positive influence on 
the organisation’s financial performance, and they are effective in monitoring on behalf of 
stakeholders, shareholders and management. Scarborough, Haynie and Shock (2010) 
support this in maintaining that having a majority of non-executive directors on the board 
helps to solve problems where there is a conflict of interest. When such instances arise, 
management can be swayed by an independent board.  
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In relation to board composition, there are two types of directors, namely, executive and 
non-executive. The difference between these two types of directors are discussed below. 
2.4.4  Definition of the executive director 
Executive directors are defined as members appointed by the board to oversee the 
activities of the organisation. Deloitte (2013) and PwC (2011) define executive directors 
in terms of the Act as board members who are actively involved in the day-to-day 
management of the organisation. Their role is to perform duties with honesty by serving 
the best interests of the organisation and to give direction in terms of policy (JSE, 2016). 
The Act further specifies that executive directors must possess certain skills and 
qualifications before they can be appointed (Elms et al., 2015). According to the Act, it is 
mandatory for directors to sign a declaration that they will act in the best interests of the 
organisation and in terms of the Act (Stevens and De Beer, 2016 & Stevens (2017). The 
CEO of the organisation is referred to as an executive director.  
Another definition given by Olivia (2013) defines the executive director as a person 
responsible for the success of the organisation by ensuring that the organisation’s 
objectives are achieved. This person must possess a mixture of experience, knowledge, 
skills and qualifications (Zogning, 2017). Executive and non-executive directors are both 
regarded as directors of the organisation; the requirements to appoint a non-executive 
director are similar to those of executive director (Kouki & Guizani, 2015).  
2.4.5 Definition of the non-executive director 
Executive and non-executive directors are similar in nature. Non-executive directors must 
also have a mix of experience, knowledge, skills and qualifications, similar to those of an 
executive director. Stevens (2017) argues that there is no difference between executive 
and non-executive directors insofar as they are both referred to as directors and have 
more or less the same roles and responsibilities.  
Nonetheless, King III differentiates between the two types of directors as follows: non-
executive directors establish the strategic direction of the organisation whereas executive 
directors control the strategy set out by non-executive directors (Prettirajh, 2017). They 
do this by being involved in the day-to-day running of the business. According to King III, 
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the board refers to non-executive directors and management refers to the executive 
directors (Afolabi, 2015 & IoDSA, 2009). The board thus delegates to management to 
implement strategic decisions effectively. 
Olivia (2013) and the IoDSA (2009) further clarify the difference between executive and 
non-executive directors. Olivia (2013) explains that as executive directors are involved in 
running the organisation on a day-to-day basis, they are considered as employees of the 
organisation and receive salaries. Non-executive directors, on the other hand, are not 
employees of the organisation. 
Prettirajh (2017) investigated the relationship between non-executive directors’ 
remuneration and organisational performance for top 40 JSE listed organisations in South 
Africa. Using correlation analyses and return on assets (ROA) and return on equities 
(ROE) as measurement, data was analysed for organisations listed in the financial sector 
of the JSE from 2006 to 2015. The findings indicate that there is a relationship between 
the two and that a majority of non-executive directors improves the performance of an 
organisation. The board has a duty to monitor directors within the organisation to ensure 
that they discharge their duties properly in terms of board composition. The section below 
discusses different forms of board structure and how executive and non-executive 
directors impact an organisation. 
2.4.6 Structure of the board: Examination 
Adams and Mehran (2012) examine the relationship between bank performance and 
board composition using the following variables: age, gender and educational level. The 
research was conducted in Germany, covering the past 34 years. The study found that 
banks failed to choose proper governance structures. The findings also revealed that 
board composition and board size positively influence a bank’s performance.  
Muchemwa, Padia and Callaghan (2016) conducted a study using data from South 
Africa’s JSE for all organisations from across all industrial sectors that were listed on the 
JSE from 2006 to 2012 and conclude that in board composition, a mixture of non-
executive and executive directors improves the financial performance. Prettirajh (2017), 
on the other hand, argues that having more non-executive directors does not necessarily 
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guarantee success or even failure of the organisation; instead, it takes good directors to 
always act in the best interests of the organisation. 
Oosthuizen and Lahner (2016) explored the difference between board composition and 
the sustainable performance of organisations listed on the FTSE/ JSE All Share Index 
from 2004 to 2010, taking into account gender, nationality, professional body qualification 
and consideration of directors with no business background. The elements of social 
responsibility, investment and sustainability performance were used. Results showed that 
organisations seeking to improve their performance and maintain sustainability should 
consider hiring non-executive directors with no business background on their boards. 
Empirical studies by Adams and Mehran (2012), Kouki and Guizani (2015) and Shrivastav 
and Kalsie (2015) maintain that experience of non-executive directors positively 
influences the performance of the organisations in Greek and India. In contrast, 
Oosthuizen and Lahner (2016) believe that non-executive directors do not need a 
business background to positively influence the performance of the organisation.  
The BoD appoints a chairman of the board who is responsible for steering the board and 
acting as a channel of communication between the board and shareholders. The duties 
of the chairman are discussed below. 
2.4.7 Chairman of the board of directors 
It is the duty of the chairman to conduct evaluation assessments on a yearly basis to 
assess the independence and performance of directors and to document the outcome in 
the organisation’s integrated annual report (IoDSA, 2009). The chairman should set the 
ethical tone for the board and the organisation, and provide leadership to the board by 
not limiting the principle of collective responsibility for board decision-making (PwC, 
2016). The chairman should have skills to manage any conflicts of interest that may arise 
between shareholders and directors (see section 2.4.3) to make directors aware of their 
responsibilities through induction programmes and continuous professional education 
(Singh, 2014). Lastly, the chairman should build and maintain the stakeholders’ trust 
(IoDSA, 2015). 
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An executive or non-executive director cannot be the chairman of the board. In 
compliance with King III, there should be a separation between the CEO and the chairman 
to promote independence (Scarborough et al., 2010). Henman (2013) and the IoDSA 
(2009) maintain that the role of the chairman and the CEO is separate in the following 
way: the running of the board is the responsibility of the chairman whereas the CEO is 
responsible for running of the organisation by delegating authority to senior managers. 
The chairman plays an important role by acting as a channel of communication between 
the board and management and ensuring the proper functioning of the board. It is the 
chairman’s duty to ensure that the board is directed accordingly on issues pertaining to 
board meetings and allowing directors to ask relevant questions in order to make well-
informed decisions when performing their duties (Dey, Engel & Liu, 2011). 
King III requires that the chairman be elected by the board; however, there are certain 
requirements that need to be met before an appointment is made. The chairman must be 
an independent, non-executive director; their duty is to provide effective leadership (PwC, 
2012). The CEO must not be appointed in the chairmanship position unless three years 
have elapsed since they resigned from the CEO position. In a case where the appointed 
chairman is not an independent director or is an executive director, the disclosure must 
be provided in the integrated annual report, and an explanation or justification must be 
given for not complying with the King III recommendation (Scholtz, 2014). 
It is the responsibility of the board to ensure that the role and functions of the CEO and 
the chairman are separated in a formalised document (Kouki and Guizani, 2015). Their 
performance needs to be assessed against the stated criteria for each, and should be 
disclosed in the integrated annual report (SARB, 2016b). The board must monitor the 
chairman’s independence and ensure that they are free from conflict of interest. A lead 
independent director must be appointed as a deputy if the chairman’s independence is 
questionable or impaired (IoDSA 2009; Henman, 2013; Scholtz, 2014). The chairman 
may not be a member of the audit committee; both the chairman and CEO may attend 
board committee meetings by invitation (IoDSA, 2009; PwC, 2013). 
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King III maintains that the functions of the chairman include but are not limited to setting 
the ethical tone at the top, providing effective leadership, selecting board members, 
evaluating the performance of non-executive directors on a yearly basis, managing 
conflict of interest among board members and acting as a link between the board and 
management (Yusoff & Alhaji, 2012). The function of the CEO, on the other hand, is 
developing strategies that need board approval, monitoring and reporting to the board, 
including compliance issues, ensuring that all recommended best practices are applied 
within the organisation and providing justification if recommendations have not been 
applied (PwC, 2012). If a candidate is appointed as CEO and is also the chairman of the 
board, they have CEO duality. Studies by Aveni (2016) and Guillet, Seo, Kucukutsa and 
Lee (2013) investigate the relationship between the BoD and CEO duality. According to 
organisational theory, CEO duality creates strong leadership skills, whereas the agency 
theory argues that CEO duality reduces the monitoring of the board’s effectiveness. 
The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 highlighted the importance of robust corporate 
governance mechanisms in the banking sector by the BoD. Sakawa and Watanabel 
(2011) examined the relationship between board size and financial performance of foreign 
branches in the banking sector from 2006-2009. The results revealed that banks with 
larger boards do not perform well in terms of financial performance. Recommendations 
were made that the board structures of foreign branches may cause agency problems 
(see section 2.4).  
The chairman’s skills in managing, often complex and sensitive relationships with the BoD 
expressing different views on strategy while striving to attain meaningful consensus on 
board and organisation-wide issues, is viewed as fundamental to the long-term future of 
the organisation (Cadbury, 1992). Dey et al., 2011; PwC, 2016; Singh, 2014; Scarborough 
et al., 2010: Yusoff and Alhaji, 2012 concur that, with an even greater demand for effective 
governance and transparency, the quality and capabilities of the chairman are critical to 
the performance of the board and in turn the organisation. The above summary of recent 
studies outlines the characteristics of the high performing chairman. 
As the governance disclosures framework has been analysed, it is now important to 
understand how these specific elements are relevant to the banking sector. 
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2.6 Overview of the banking sector 
Banks are defined as deposit-taking institutions that match assets and liabilities, earn 
interest on transactions, savings, investments and credit facilities. Banks are also 
involved in underwriting policies, the provision of loans and extension of brokerage 
services (SARB, n.d. (a). Banks, in general, collect deposits from individual customers 
and corporates (corporate surplus) and lend to qualifying needy customers (Marozva, 
2017). Some of these deposits may be fixed for a certain period, while some are 
withdrawable on demand. Other sources of funds include bonds and equity; normally 
these are long-term in nature. On the assets side, banks purchase fixed assets, hold 
some reserve in the SARB and advance the surplus as loans to individual customers and 
corporates. In contrast to this, African Bank used a different model to fund the business 
(see section 2.5). 
According to the Banking Association of South Africa (BASA, 2018), there are currently, 
17 registered banks in South Africa in terms of the Bank Act 94 of 1990, including African 
Bank, which is the focus of this study. These registered banks are governed by the SARB 
and are required to critically comply with legislative and regulatory framework issues such 
as the Banks Act, the Act, King III and NCA (JSE, 2016). The SARB was established in 
1921 and as well with the main objective of maintaining price stability, governing monetary 
policy, providing sustainable economic growth, and providing banking regulation and 
supervision.  
The SARB serves as the Central Bank of Southern Africa (SARB, n.d. (b); Chisasa, 2014). 
The Reserve Bank assigned the Banking Supervision Department (BSD), with the duty 
to ensure a sound, financial, stable and internationally competitive banking system. The 
purpose of BSD is to ensure the following: financial stability, a balanced economy, 
financial efficiency and the protection of depositors’ money in order to comply with the 
Banks Act (SARB, 2016a). 
The SARB is mandated by the Banks Act to implement and maintain a supervisory review 
of all the banks that are registered in terms of this Act in South Africa. This review process 
may take place in the following ways (Government Gazette, 2007; SARB, 2016a) namely: 
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▪ On-site examination and inspection of the bank; 
▪ Off-site review of the bank; 
▪ Discussion with the BoD and employees responsible for risk management function 
and compliance function of the bank; 
▪ Reviewing the work done by external auditors of the bank; and 
▪ Reviewing reports submitted in line with the Banks Act by the bank. 
The banking sector has been severely criticised for its role in the recent financial crises. 
In particular, poor governance disclosure by banks has often been cited as one of the 
causes of the financial crisis (De Haan & Vlahu, 2016). Disclosure refers to the 
components of governance which are discussed below.  
2.7 Governance disclosure 
Good governance disclosure demonstrates the extent to which corporate governance 
practices are observable to outsiders. This can be achieved when the BoD is transparent 
in conducting the activities of the organisation (Fung, 2014). Transparency is indeed the 
key component of corporate governance, which integrates a system of checks and 
balances among the BoD (De Haan &Vlahu, 2016). Transparency ensures the manner in 
which the organisation is run is clear and open, particularly when communicating to 
stakeholders about the operations of the organisation (Gisbert & Navallas, 2013).  
According to Fung (2014), the organisation should adopt the following to achieve 
transparency: applying accurate accounting methods such as IFRS, making full, prompt 
disclosure of organisational information to stakeholders, disclosing any conflict of interest 
of directors or shareholders and using the applicable regulatory framework. 
Patrick, Paulinus and Nympha (2015) point out that in recent years, governance 
disclosure has come into the spotlight in terms of compliance as the increasing failure of 
governance in organisations translates to an inability to meet expectations of 
stakeholders. This inability affects both financial performance and management practices 
of the organisation. The IoDSA (2009) maintains that for organisations to build and 
maintain stakeholders’ trust, their annual integrated reports should mention how they 
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comply with regulations that manage the disclosure of corporate governance, as per the 
King III principles and recommendations.  
Corporate governance disclosure, according to Pretorius, Leonard and Strydom (2013), 
has been heavily criticised due to governance and compliance failures in organisations 
across the world. In response to these failures, legislative and regulatory acts have been 
introduced. However, it has been argued that compliance with these legislative and 
regulatory acts is costly and time-consuming. Another concern is that adherence to these 
measures cannot be enforced.  
To ensure good governance, organisations in South Africa use the business process 
management system (BPMS). This system does electronic monitoring and observations 
to verify compliance with principles and the proper implementation of the compliance 
framework. According to King III, there are seven principles of good governance (IODSA, 
2009), namely, fairness, accountability, reliability, transparency, discipline, independence 
and responsibility. In light of the above, the foundation of these principles is that directors 
should act honestly, in good faith and in the best interests of the organisation. 
The lack of financial disclosure and inadequate corporate governance practices 
contributed to the financial crisis in many countries during 2007-2008. Organisations 
should work under pressure to provide timely, constant and accurate information to 
shareholders and the public (Fung, 2014). According to Makiwane and Nirupa (2013), 
organisations should provide disclosure on financial performance, liabilities and corporate 
governance issues.  
The IoDSA (2009) indicates that organisations are required to disclose essential and 
useful information about their operations and how they complied with governance in their 
integrated annual reporting to build and maintain stakeholders trust. Camilleri (2015) 
points out that the disclosure of governance is a trend that increases the level of 
compliance within the organisation. This is supported by Ahmed, Haji and Anifowose 
(2016), who investigated the initial trends in governance disclosures after the introduction 
of integrated annual reporting in South African organisations. The results show that there 
was a significant increase in the governance disclosures after the adoption of integrated 
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annual reporting in South African organisations. Another result noted was that the 
disclosure of governance was becoming institutionalised over time across industries, yet 
other organisations are failing to provide meaningful disclosures in their integrated annual 
reporting.  
The disclosure of governance achieves the following: it is an effective tool for improving 
and monitoring investors’ protection, and it encourages better enterprise management 
(Al-Shammari & Al-Sultan, 2010; Al-Janadi, Rahman & Omar, 2012). Bhat (2013) 
investigated the impact of governance disclosure in relation to risk management 
disclosures and market pricing of the fair value gains and losses (FVGL). The results 
reveal that banks with strong corporate governance are likely to disclose more about their 
risk practices. Furthermore, the market pricing of FVGL increases the level of disclosures. 
Another result was that the disclosure’s effect on the market pricing of the FVGL assisted 
banks during the financial crisis with risky assets and improved the poor performance of 
the bank. Lastly, banks with higher disclosure and strong governance are more likely to 
be relevant and reliable. 
Many investors take into account the corporate governance disclosure in integrated 
annual reports as the key element when making an investment decision (Camilleri, 2015). 
In cases where there are poor corporate governance practices, investors are highly 
unlikely to invest (Bhat, 2013). Organisations that are lacking in governance disclosure, 
financial disclosure, accountability and transparency, transparency were discussed in 
section 2.3.2.  
De Villiers, Rinaldi and Unerman (2014) define an integrated annual report as a 
summarised communication about the organisational strategies, governance, 
performance, external regulations, acts and compliance with internal and external policies 
in the context of the organisation’s external environment which leads to the creation of 
value over the short, medium and long term. 
Good governance practices benefit the organisation and investors, reflecting on the 
positive financial performance of the organisation. Governance is disclosed in the 
integrated report and is widely regarded as the most effective mechanism that regulators 
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use to encourage better corporate governance (De Haan & Vlahu, 2016). The integrated 
report places information in the hands of investors to make decisions about whether or 
not to invest in a particular organisation. An integrated annual report is highly rated if 
sufficient information regarding the organisation is disclosed to properly assess corporate 
governance and to establish the degree to which the organisation responds to its 
shareholder’s needs. Samaha, Dahawy, Hussainey and Stapleton (2012) note that the 
disclosure of governance according to King III refers to the state of the organisation’s 
compliance, made available to stakeholders in the form of an integrated annual report, 
which should demonstrate how the board established an effective compliance framework 
and processes.   
King III stipulates that all organisations should report annually on the governance of the 
following: the operations of the organisation, the sustainability issues affecting the 
organisation and the financial performance of the organisation through the integrated 
annual report (IoDSA, 2009). The IoDSA (2009) further specifies that:  
▪ The board should report to its stakeholders on how the organisation has positively 
and negatively affected the economic life of the community in which it operates 
and should provide forward-looking information; 
▪  The board should disclose information that is complete, timely, relevant, accurate, 
honest, accessible and comparable with the past financial performance of the 
organisation; 
▪ The board should report on leadership structure, including skills and the 
background, competence, gender and experience of those who are charged with 
governance; 
▪ The board should disclose how the organisation has implemented governance 
practices; 
▪ The board should disclose its understanding of governance, ethics, effective 
leadership and whether it is the custodian of governance in the organisation; 
▪ If the organisation has applied all the principles and recommendations of King III, 
a positive statement to that effect should be made. If the board or those charged 
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with governance decide not to apply a specific principle or recommendation, such 
information should be fully disclosed to the organisation's stakeholders; and 
▪ The reasons for the removal or resignation of a director should be disclosed as 
well as how the board discharged its responsibility for the establishment of an 
effective compliance framework and process. 
In this study, King III is used as the basis for testing the disclosures in the integrated 
annual report of African Bank. Inferences about the African Bank BoD understanding, and 
compliance gathered from their annual integrated report.  The study aims to analyse the 
extent to which African Bank comply with governance disclosures in accordance with King 
III in their annual integrated reporting, which is the objective of enquiry. PwC (2016) notes 
that organisations tend to disclose the minimum information required by regulation or by 
law. Ally (2016) adds that organisations may thus omit to disclose risks which are not 
required to be reported on by law. It has been noted that the main failure leading to 
financial crisis stemmed directly from the lack of financial disclosure and inadequate 
governance practices. Therefore, organisations are now under increased pressure to 
provide timely, consistent and accurate information to shareholders, stakeholders and the 
public (Fung, 2014). The IoDSA (2015) confirms that inadequate disclosures of 
governance practices contribute to poor performance by board and leads to financial 
crises. 
The recent financial crises have given a measure of the weak damage, that weak 
governance mechanism may cause. The BoD of banks must actively demonstrate to 
stakeholders their ethics, honesty, integrity and transparency at all times. This study, 
demonstrate the BoD evaluation present critical to understanding and improving 
governance practices, individual contributions and stakeholder expectations and to meet 
regulatory goals in terms of King III.  
King III sets out the principles that the organisations must disclose in their integrated 
annual reports. This study considered only nine principles from King III. This is because 
the focus was on the board of African Bank, and in particular, its leadership and 
composition. 
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2.8: The nine governance principles of the BoD 
The following nine principles were identified from King III as a set of principles that at a 
minimum, should be included in integrated annual reports. 
Table 2.1: The nine principles for governance of the BoD 
Number Principle for inclusion in the integrated annual report 
1. The organisation should disclose that the board provides effective leadership based 
on an ethical foundation. 
2. The organisation should disclose that the board acts as the custodian of corporate 
governance. 
3. The organisation should disclose that the board ensures compliance with applicable 
laws and considers adherence to non-binding rules, codes and standards within the 
organisation. 
4. The organisation should disclose that the board and its directors act in the best 
interests of the organisation. 
5. The organisation should disclose that the board ensures that the chairman of the 
board is an independent, executive director and that there is a separation between 
role of the CEO and chairman. 
6. The organisation should disclose that the board maintains a balance of power, with 
a majority of non-executive, independent directors. 
7. The organisation should disclose that the board follows a formal process when 
appointing directors. 
8. The board should disclose that there are inductions and ongoing training and 
development for directors that is conducted through a formal process. 
9. The organisation should disclose that the board evaluates individual directors on a 
yearly basis. 
(Source: Adopted from: King III) 
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2.9 Governance disclosure of African Bank 
African Bank was registered in terms of the Banks Act, which makes it mandatory for 
banks to comply with laws and regulations such as the Act, the JSE listing requirements 
and King III (SARB, 2016b). The IoDSA (2009) recommends that there should be 
measures to improve board-level governance in banks. For example, the Banks Act 
contains banking practices that must be followed on board structure and expertise of 
board members as well as an assessment of their functionality. 
As explained in section 1.1, African Bank used a different business model to other banks. 
Its funding was raised from international markets and shadow banking, which was then 
lent to customers as unsecured credit without earning any other interest. This business 
model eventually led to the demise of the bank (Donnelly, 2014; Mare & Sanderson, 
2017). 
The SARB (2016b) indicates that the following factors contributed to the failure of African 
Bank: reckless lending which was in contravention of NCA (see section 1.1); lack of 
controls, which falls under compliance and non-compliance with the Act; board 
composition; separation of the CEO from the chairman; and the JSE listing requirements. 
The SARB failed to provide monitoring to African Bank.  
2.10 Summary and conclusion 
In this Chapter, governance and compliance were analysed based on the guidelines of 
King III. The effectiveness of governance and compliance by the board are contributing 
factors to the good performance of an organisation, and they ensure a sustainable 
competitive advantage. A robust governance framework includes policies, procedures 
and processes which ensure the good governance of the bank, provide guidance to 
directors and support the operations of the business.  
Corporate governance may be a poor or strong influence on governance, depending on 
how the board applies its governance. Despite the importance of governance disclosure, 
boards are responsible for the implementation of governance and compliance with 
regulatory requirements.  
40 
 
The literature review revealed that one of the top challenges of both commercial and small 
banks was poor governance, which negatively affected the economy. The failure of banks 
was seen as being due to non-compliance with the following:  King III; the appointment of 
executive and non-executive directors, following a risky business model; composition of 
the board; compliance with the functions of the board; duality of the CEO, lack of controls; 
and separation of the duties of the CEO and chairman. 
 A good governance framework includes policies, procedures and processes to ensure 
that the organisation achieve its objectives.  
This Chapter also examined compliance globally and in South African organisations, 
pursuant to banking sector regulatory requirements, legislation, Acts. And also outline 
that the BoD of the organisations are responsible for establishing a compliance function 
and overseeing the organisations compliance with the regulatory bodies. 
The literature and empirical studies provided a conceptual introduction to governance and 
compliance. An overview was given of the banking sector, governance disclosure with 
specific reference to the case study of African Bank was discussed based on the available 
literature on the subject and was assessed in terms of the literature review. 
The next Chapter presents the methodological issues identified in the literature and the 
research design of the study.  
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CHAPTER 3: Research Methodology 
 
3.1 Methodology  
This Chapter deals with the research methodology and the research approach adopted 
in this study. These give directions to the researcher in planning and implementing a study 
in order to achieve the intended outcomes (Bradley, 2007). Cormack’s (2000) and Ndou 
(2016) define research methodology as the adopted method that is followed by a set of 
procedures applicable for a particular study. According to Burns and Grove (2003), the 
research methodology comprises the entire strategy of study, from the identification and 
assessment of the problem to the final phase of data analysis, conclusion and 
recommendations. Leedy and Ormrod (2015), noted that there are two approaches of 
research methodology, namely, qualitative research and quantitative research approach 
of which they involve a similar process. For instance, they both entail identifying a 
research problem, reviewing related literature and collecting and analysing data. Both 
approaches have certain characteristics, and they are as follows. Quantitative; includes 
numerical data, representative by large sample, statistical analysis, numbers and for 
qualitative; includes textual, informative or small sample, words (Leedy & Ormrod, 2015; 
Saunders et al., 2016; Yin, 2014). For this study, a qualitative approach is used because 
the researcher is examining documents, existing literature, dissertations articles.  
This Chapter also deals with the research design, research methods and content analysis 
used in the study. 
3.2  Research approach 
The objective of this study is to analyse the governance disclosures of African Bank. A 
deductive reasoning approach is best-suited to this objective. Deductive reasoning is 
used for generalisability, moving from the general to the specific, it verifies theory or 
falsification, and for data collection, it uses proposition or existing theory (Saunders et al., 
2016; Msweli, 2018). This study uses the relevant principles and recommendations from 
King III to analyse governance disclosures of African Bank. 
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Based on the recommendations of King III, the researcher developed a checklist that was 
used to analyse the governance disclosure of African Bank in its last published 2014 
integrated annual report.  
3.3  Research design 
According to Saunders et al., (2007; 2016), a research design is important for any study 
in order to achieve the research objectives, which include ethical issues, the credibility of 
sources, the type of data to be collected and how this data will be accessed and analysed. 
Blumberg, Cooper and Schindler (2011) and Grebe (2014) indicate that a research design 
provides strategies for a study. 
In this study, an exploratory design was followed. Exploratory research is used to explore 
a problem that has not been thoroughly researched before (Bash, Mouton, Sapsford & 
Jupp, 2006, Leedy & Ormrod 2015; Saunders et al., (2016)). Exploratory data was 
obtained using secondary data from literature by reviewing articles, journals, books and 
dissertations as well as King III. The qualitative research approach was used to examine 
secondary sources to establish the background to the problem and to set the context of 
the study. Primary data was collected by analysing the governance disclosure in the 
banking sector, using African Bank as a case study. The study was thus qualitative in 
nature. 
3.4  Qualitative research method 
Qualitative data was collected by reviewing both empirical and non-empirical literature in 
order to address the objective of the study. Qualitative research is defined as primarily 
exploratory research used to gain an understanding of underlying reasons, and it provides 
insight into the problem (Saunders, Lewis &Thornhill, 2016). This initially involved 
examining existing literature and then conducting a secondary analysis using a self-
developed checklist based only on the recommendations of King III. A case study analysis 
was considered the most appropriate approach to obtain the most reliable results in order 
to meet the study objectives. 
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3.4.1  Case study 
A case study allows the researcher to gather extensive and in-depth data on a particular 
phenomenon. The following methods of data collection can be used: content analysis, 
past records and reports (Leedy & Ormrod, 2015; Singh, 2014; Yin, 2014;). There are 
merits and demerits about single case study versus multiple case study (Yin, 2014). In 
agreement for a single case study, Yin (2014) advocated that a single case study research 
presents a better opportunity for the deep understanding of a particular social setting. 
Msweli (2018) argued that, a multiple case study research places too much emphasis on 
general constructs and neglect the more tacit and less obvious aspects under 
investigation. In accordance with the definition of the case study, African Bank was 
chosen for this study. Thus, a case study approach was used to analyse the governance 
disclosure of African Bank using content analysis  
3.5  Content analysis 
Content analysis is a flexible research approach that can be applied to a wide variety of 
text sources (Lock & Seele, 2015). It does not require the collection of data from people 
but uses recorded information that has been collected in texts for other purposes (Peter 
& Bagshaw, 2014; Srairi, 2016; Taskin, 2015). It is also used to identify the intentions of 
focus groups, individuals and institutions (Boyd-Barrett, Bulk & Van Den, 2002; Franzosi, 
2008; Lock & Seele, 2015). For the purposes of this study, King III and the 2014 integrated 
annual report of African Bank were used to collect and analyse data. The study only 
considered the 2014 integrated annual report because it was the last report published by 
African Bank before it was placed under curatorship by the SARB.  
Most organisations collect and store a variety of data to support their operations 
(Saunders et al., 2009). A content analysis research technique was deemed the most 
appropriate as the study collected published and publicly available information from 
relevant documents and credible websites. Collecting data by means of the Internet is 
acknowledged as an effective method by Crowther and Lancaster (2009) and Gosling, 
Vazire, Srivastava and John (2004). Once data has been collected, a proposed analysis 
can be used to analyse data. 
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3.5.1  Data analysis tools 
According to Marczyk, Dematteo and Festinger (2005), data represents the ‘fruit of the 
researcher’s labour’, because it provides information describing the problem being 
investigated. Data analysis helps the researcher to interpret data to give a meaningful 
understanding of the research problem being investigated (Ndou, 2016). 
A self-developed checklist was formulated based only on King III. This list was selective 
and did not cover all the governance principles because the study only focuses on the 
governance of the board. Therefore, only principles relating to the disclosures in the 
integrated report regarding the BoD of African Bank were considered, as the objective of 
this checklist was to analyse the governance disclosure of African Bank in this context. 
The contents of the checklist are presented in Table 3.1 below.  
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Table 3.1: Self- developed checklist 
No. Checklist Questions 
Does the African Bank: 
1. disclose in its integrated annual report that the board provides effective leadership based 
on an ethical foundation? 
2. disclose in its integrated annual report that the board acts as the custodian of corporate 
governance? 
3. disclose in its integrated annual report that the board ensures compliance with applicable 
laws and considers adherence to non-binding rules, codes and standards within the 
organisation? 
4. disclose in its integrated annual report that the board and its directors act in the best 
interests of the organisation? 
5. disclose in its integrated annual report that the board ensures that the chairman is an 
independent, non-executive director and does it ensure that there is a separation between 
the role of the CEO and chairman? 
6. disclose in its integrated annual report that the board maintains a balance of power, with a 
majority of non-executive, independent directors? 
7. disclose in its integrated annual report that the board follows a formal process when 
appointing directors? 
8. have formal induction and ongoing training and development for directors? 
9. disclose in its integrated annual report that the board evaluates individual directors on a 
yearly basis? 
 (Source: Own research) 
The purpose of the above checklist was to assess the degree to which African Bank 
complied with the requirements of governance disclosure based only on the King III 
requirements. 
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A self-developed checklist was compared with the governance disclosure of African Bank 
using the integrated annual report for the year 2014 to verify whether the bank 
demonstrated compliance.  
3.4.2  Population and unit analysis 
In research, the term ‘population’ does not automatically refer to people, but the complete 
set from which the research sample is drawn (Bradley, 2007; Ndou, 2016; Saunders et 
al., 2016; Prettirajh, 2017). The banking sector was the population in this study, and 
African Bank was chosen as a unit analysis because it was the latest bank to experience 
failure in South Africa. 
 
3.5  Reliability and validity 
According to Leedy & Ormrod (2015) and Ndou (2016) in order to maintain the reliability 
of data, some form of measurement instrument has to be applied. For measurement to 
be reliable, a repeated study must produce similar results from similar methodologies, 
since the data is available from the same sources.  
The reliability of the data was ensured by accessing credible websites, namely, King III, 
the SARB, IoDSA, as well as reviewing past records and documents pertaining to the 
disclosure of governance in the banking sector, chiefly because of the reliability and 
trustworthiness of the institutional sources that compiled the data. This type of 
measurement has been used repeatedly in a variety of studies by different scholars and 
produced accurate, consistent, comparable and reliable results. African Bank was the 
subject of the investigation, and the data was evaluated using criteria that focused on the 
type of report and the purpose of the report.   
Validity is defined as the extent to which the data collection method or research method 
describes or measures what is supposed to describe or measure (Crowther & Lancaster, 
2009; Yin, 2014; Leedy & Ormrod, 2015). Validity is essential in research to demonstrate 
the trustworthiness of the study (Ndou, 2016). The purpose of validity is to increase the 
accuracy of findings by controlling the variables used in the study and to thereby build 
confidence in the results (Saunders et al., 2009). To ensure that the data collected was 
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useful, an adequate and valid method was used to analyse data selected, the checklist 
formulated based on King III conducted was used to analyse data for the study. 
3.6  Scope and limitations of the study 
This limited scope dissertation analysis the governance disclosure in the banking sector 
using African Bank as a case study. The study contributes to the existing body of 
knowledge on this topic. Due to the limitations imposed on the length of the dissertation, 
the study focuses solely on African Bank in South Africa as no other banks were 
considered in terms of data collection. Another limitation is that the study only examined 
one African Bank integrated annual report, from the year 2014. 
3.7  Ethical consideration 
The researcher must act ethically when designing and planning to conduct a study by 
seeking approval from the organisations or individuals concerned (Saunders et al., 2016). 
Diener and Crandall (1978) who are experts in the field and Leedy and Ormrod (2010) 
encourage adherence to four key principles to ensure that research is conducted in an 
ethical way, namely, (i) protection from harm, (ii) ethical clearance, (iii) the right to privacy, 
and (iv) honesty with professional colleagues. These principles were adhered to ensure 
that the research was conducted in an ethical manner.  
For the purposes of this research, a desktop study was applicable, as the information 
accessed was available in the public domain and was secondary in nature. The ethics 
application for conducting research using existing data was submitted to the Research 
Ethics Committee at the University of Johannesburg. The researcher was granted 
permission to source secondary data from the SARB and African Bank. The ethical 
clearance approval code was SAREC20180620-01. The researcher confirms that the 
methods, results, findings, conclusions and recommendations made in this study have 
strictly been used for academic purposes only and remains the property of the University 
of Johannesburg. The results, findings and conclusions remain the property of the 
University of Johannesburg and will only be disclosed by the university if need be and 
only to authorised officials. 
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Although the data obtained may be in the public domain, the results and their 
interpretations in relation to competitor banks and standing of regulatory, compliance and 
supervisory authorities may cause significant harm if disclosed to competitors and or 
authorities.  
The role of this researcher is limited to submitting the final bound version of the research 
report to the College of Business and Economics at the University of Johannesburg. 
3.8  Conclusion  
Chapter 3 discussed the research methodology, research approach, research design, 
content analysis and qualitative research of the study. A qualitative research methodology 
was followed, and secondary data was used to establish the background to the problem 
and the context of the study. The study adopted a deductive reasoning approach by 
analysing existing literature to gather data and convert it into theory. The study was 
exploratory in nature as it investigated a problem that had not been thoroughly researched 
before. A case study analysis was considered to be most appropriate for the study in 
order to obtain the most reliable results to meet the study objectives. 
Data collection was conducted by utilising published reports and information collected 
from credible websites. A self-developed checklist was formulated using King III and was 
compared to the governance disclosure of African Bank. Content analysis was used to 
analyse texts, reports, past records, and transform these into data. 
Chapter 4 presents the findings of the study. 
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CHAPTER 4: Presentation and Discussion of Results 
 
4.1  Introduction 
This Chapter presents the empirical results for discussion which were obtained using the 
methodologies described in the previous Chapter. Thus, sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.10 analyse 
and interpret the data, assessing whether African Bank was compliant whereas sections 
4.4.10 and 4.5 analyse and interpret the data, assessing whether African Bank discloses 
sufficient information about its operations. 
4.2 Governance disclosure framework requirements 
Good governance practices assist in complying with the regulation for each business unit, 
for example, implementing policies and procedures based on these laws and regulations; 
establishing processes to supervise compliance and mitigate risk; monitoring compliance; 
and reporting to the various boards and management on the effectiveness of these efforts 
(see section 2.2 governance and 2.3 compliance) (Frigo & Anderson, 2009). 
Thebe (2017) maintains that good governance is associated with King III, knowledge and 
understanding of the Act and JSE listing requirements when upholding values such as 
responsibility, accountability, professionalism and ethical conduct. The IoDSA (2009) 
concludes that organisations should disclose in their integrated annual reports how 
governance and compliance have been applied, according to King III requirements. King 
III contains principles and recommendations of governance requirements that African 
Bank should have complied with. King III further states that organisations need to explain 
why they did not apply a particular requirement, whereas the JSE sets out requirements 
with which listed companies must comply (Ally, 2016).  
This study analysed and interpreted data from African Bank’s 2014 integrated annual 
report; a conclusion was then made to determine whether or not the bank understands 
King III principles and recommendations and provided adequate disclosure of its 
governance. 
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4.3    Governance disclosure for the purposes of testing 
The IoDSA (2009) states in King III that, organisations can either apply the governance 
requirements or explain why certain requirements were not applied. Makiwane and Nirupa 
(2013) note that since King III was introduced in South Africa, organisations have widely 
adopted the principle of apply-or-explain, which has increased the level of the disclosure 
(see section 2.7). 
Fama and Jensen (1983) and Prettirajh (2017) observe that good corporate governance 
disclosure improves the performance of an organisation in the best interests of 
shareholders by limiting agency costs, thereby ensuring the survival of the business. This 
is done by solving problems between directors and shareholders. The distinction between 
a director and shareholders was discussed in section 2.4.  
The BoD should promote transparency in conducting the activities of the organisation and 
disclose in the integrated annual report the extent to which governance practices were 
implemented within the organisation (see section 2.7) (IoDSA, 2009). The law of 
transparency requires that all listed organisations prepare an annual corporate 
governance report, where the organisation provides detailed information on the 
governance structure and compliance recommendations in its integrated annual report 
(Gisbert & Navallas, 2013). According to Gisbert and Navallas (2013), the failure to 
disclose corporate governance practices indicates that there are ineffectiveness and 
inadequacy in the framework of the organisation, which leads to non-compliance.  
Table 4.1 below shows the governance and compliance disclosure requirements. Table 
4.1 below contains four columns. The first column represents the King III disclosure 
requirements; these requirements are used to evaluate the compliance of African Bank. 
The second column represents the self-developed checklist, based on the compliance 
requirements set out in Chapter 3. The third column indicates whether or not the bank 
made the disclosure. The results were recorded as either a Yes or a No. The last column 
indicates the section in the study where the results are discussed. 
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Table 4.1: Governance and compliance disclosure requirements for the purposes 
of testing compliance 
 Table 2.1        Table 3.1       Analysis 
King III disclosure 
requirements 
Self-developed checklist Disclosed Discussion 
The board should provide 
effective leadership based on 
an ethical foundation. 
Does African Bank disclose in 
its integrated annual report 
that the board provides 
effective leadership based on 
an ethical foundation? 
Yes 4.4.1 
The board should act as the 
custodian of corporate 
governance. 
Does African Bank disclose in 
its integrated annual reporting 
that the board act as the 
custodian of corporate 
governance? 
Yes  4.4.2 
The board should ensure that 
the company complies with 
applicable laws and 
considers adherence to non-
binding rules, codes and 
standards. 
Does African Bank disclose in 
its integrated annual report 
that the board ensures 
compliance with applicable 
laws and considers 
adherence to non-binding 
rules, codes and standards 
within the organisation? 
Yes  4.4.3 
The board and its directors 
should act in the best 
interests of the company. 
Does African Bank disclose in 
its integrated annual report 
that the board and its directors 
act in the best interests of the 
organisation? 
Yes  4.4.4 
The board should elect a 
chairman of the board, who is 
an independent non-
executive director. The CEO 
of the company should not 
also fulfil the role of 
chairman of the board. 
Does African Bank disclose in 
its integrated annual report 
that the board ensures that the 
chairman of the board is an 
independent non-executive 
director and does the board 
ensure that there is a 
separation of the CEO and the 
chairman’s role? 
Yes  4.4.5 
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Table 2.1  Table 3.1  Analysis  
 
 
King III disclosure 
requirements 
 
Self-developed checklist Disclosed Discussion 
The board should comprise a 
balance of power, with a 
majority of non-executive 
directors. The majority of 
non-executive directors 
should be independent. 
Does African Bank disclose in 
its integrated annual report 
that the board comprises a 
balance of power, with a 
majority of non-executive 
directors who are 
independent? 
Yes 4.4.6 
Directors should be 
appointed through a formal 
process. 
Does African Bank disclose in 
its integrated annual report 
that the board follows a formal 
process when appointing 
directors? 
Yes  4.4.7 
The induction of ongoing 
training and development of 
directors should be 
conducted through a formal 
process. 
Does the board of African 
Bank have an induction and 
ongoing training and 
development of directors that 
is conducted through a formal 
process? 
Yes 4.4.8 
The evaluation of the board, 
its committees and individual 
directors should be 
performed every year. 
Does African Bank disclose in 
its integrated annual report 
that the board perform an 
evaluation of individual 
directors on a yearly basis? 
Yes  4.4.9 
 
4.4 Empirical results of African Bank’s governance compliance with King III  
4.4.1  Checklist Requirement 1: Effective leadership based on an ethical 
foundation 
Lekganyane and Oosthuizen (2006) and Kgomo and Plant (2015) maintain that ethical 
leadership is crucial in modern management and is regarded as the key in building trust 
with stakeholders. The IoDSA (2009) states that for the board to be effective in terms of 
ethical leadership, it should uphold the values of accountability, fairness, responsibility 
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and transparency; this must also be reflected in the integrated annual report (see section 
2.3.4.2). The IoDSA (2009), therefore specifies that it is the board’s responsibility to 
ensure that management promotes a culture of ethical conduct and sets the values that 
the organisation should uphold with. This is reaffirmed by the SARB (2016b), which 
stresses that all employees and board members are required to maintain high ethical 
standards. Moreover, they must ensure that the organisation’s business practices adhere 
to both internal and external controls and that they are monitored by the bank’s BoD. The 
examples of external controls are the Banks Act, NCA, NCR, the Act and the JSE listing 
requirements. 
The results revealed that African Bank disclosed the first requirement in its integrated 
annual report; however, despite this disclosure, the bank still failed. This may be because 
either the disclosure was not accurate, or the board did not fully comply with the principle 
of explaining how it had ensured good leadership. 
According to King III, the board and its directors should act as the principal upholder of 
governance and the directors are required to act in the best interests of the organisation. 
This means having a duty of care, skills and diligence (see section 2.3.2). The SARB 
(2016) notes that the BoD of African Bank failed to exercise the necessary care, skills 
and diligence in taking control of the ethical leadership of this bank for the reasons 
enumerated below. 
▪ African Bank was charged a penalty by the National Credit Regulator by failing to 
comply with the NCA requirements in terms of lending practices (see section 1.1) 
as the leadership of the bank had failed to address its predatory lending practices 
(SARB, 2016b). This was another reason which contributed to its collapse (see 
section 2.8).  
▪ The board of the African Bank failed to diversify its funding model. For example, 
the bank only had one product which, was an unsecured loan. It did not have any 
other form of income, unlike other banks, which transact, take deposits and invest 
(see section 2.8). 
▪ The SARB (2016b) revealed that the CEO of African Bank was able to influence 
or control the board’s decision-making because the board had little experience in 
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the financial services industry. Oosthuizen and Lahner (2016) indicate that there 
should be a balance of power among directors, and no individual director should 
unduly influence the board in its decision-making (see section 2.3.2). 
In conclusion, the disclosures were not accurate because they did not mirror the reality 
of the bank. 
4.4.2  Checklist Requirement 2: Custodian of corporate governance 
The literature review in Chapter 2 discussed the importance of governance, its benefits, 
and the functions of the board. It emerged that good governance can be maintained by 
assessing organisational performance, the performance of directors and governance 
processes, all of which combine to form corporate governance.  
The corporate governance requirement should have been met by African Bank to prove 
that they had complied; this should have been reflected in the bank’s integrated annual 
report. Organisations must meet the following criteria to comply with the corporate 
governance requirement or provide a reason why they did not do so (IoDSA, 2009): 
▪ The BoD should effectively control the organisation; it should have a charter 
defining its responsibilities and should meet at least four times a year.  
▪ The BoD should provide corporate governance and monitor relationships between 
the BoD, management, the organisation and its stakeholders. Agency theory was 
discussed pertaining to the relationship between shareholders and directors in 
Section 2.4 of Chapter 2. 
▪ The BoD should ensure the positive performance of the organisation by 
considering the legitimate interests and expectations of stakeholders. 
▪ The BoD should exercise leadership, enterprise, integrity and judgement in leading 
the organisation and ensure its survival. 
The results indicate that African Bank disclosed that the BoD was in charge of corporate 
governance in its integrated annual report; however, this disclosure did not mirror the 
reality. African Bank failed to comply with the definition of governance (see section 2.2). 
According to the IoDSA (2009), governance can be maintained by assessing the 
55 
 
organisation’s business performance and the performance of its directors, by encouraging 
proper ethics and values, by the manner in which the board establishes its key policies, 
by effective oversight of regulatory issues to ensure that the short- and long-term 
objectives are achieved.  
The BoD of African Bank failed to effectively control and assess the performance of the 
organisation due to directors who failed to act in its best interests. The board of the bank 
performed poorly as directors had little or no experience in the financial services industry, 
which led to failure in terms of the Act (SARB, 2016b). The IoDSA (2015) and KPMG 
(2015) both emphasise that good governance is connected to the law and cannot be 
detached from it. The board of African Bank failed to in terms of the Act as mandated by 
section 76 (3) of the Act and King III, which states that before serving on the board, 
members must have relevant experience and qualifications. Thus, some of the board 
members did not have the necessary skills or experience to be appointed as directors in 
terms of King III (SARB, 2016b). 
As stated in King III, the decision to ‘apply or explain’ lies with the BoD. The board of 
African Bank failed to comply with the objectives of corporate governance, namely, 
fairness, accountability, responsibility and transparency. This was manifested in the 
failure to be accountable for financial losses suffered by this bank. Based on the report of 
the SARB (2016b), there was no indication that the board was held accountable for the 
bank’s financial losses which were caused by the misconduct of directors. Therefore, 
there was a lack of compliance insofar as, in terms of the Act, liability should be imposed 
on directors who act against the law. Directors are compelled to sign a declaration of 
interest to ensure transparency, responsibility and accountability (see sections 2.3.2 and 
2.3.3). 
According to the SARB (2016a), corporate governance was established to help 
organisations achieve strategic and business objectives efficiently and effectively within 
acceptable risk parameters. African Bank’s business strategy and objectives were not 
met due to poor governance structures. In light of the above discussion, African Bank’s 
disclosure is questionable.  
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4.4.3  Checklist Requirement 3: Compliance with applicable laws and regulations 
The failure to comply with applicable laws and regulations can result in the waste of 
resources, penalties from regulators and the collapse of an organisation (Bornman & 
Stack, 2015; Maposa, 2016). According to the IoDSA (2009), organisations must comply 
with applicable laws and regulations (see section 2.3.1). For African Bank to be fully 
compliant, the board should have disclosed how the following requirements were 
discharged as well as its responsibility to ensure the establishment of an effective 
compliance framework and processes (Marx, 2008; IoDSA, 2009).  
▪ Compliance with King III (see section 2.3.2); 
▪ Compliance with other applicable laws which should be understood in terms of 
obligations and for the protection of the organisation; 
▪ Identification of the laws, codes and standards applicable to the organisation 
ensured by the board; and 
▪ The familiarity of directors with the applicable laws, general rules and standards to 
be able to discharge their duties in the best interests of the organisation, with due 
care, skill and diligence. 
The assessment indicated that African Bank disclosed the third requirement in its 
integrated annual report; however, this disclosure does not mirror reality. The disclosure 
requirements require the board to comply with applicable laws and regulations and act in 
the best interests of the organisation. According to the SARB (2016b), African Bank failed 
to act in the best interest of the organisation and to comply with the Banks Act 94 of 1990. 
The Act clearly states that it is the responsibility of the board to report any failures of the 
bank to SARB. This bank failed in this regard (see section 2.7). 
The SARB (2016b), Sharma (2014), Mare and Sanderson (2017) mention that African 
Bank was fined R300 million by the National Credit Regulator (NCR) for providing loans 
to customers without performing affordability assessment tests. African Bank also failed 
to comply with the NCA for reckless lending and the proposed International Accounting 
Services Board (IASB) on the impairment of financial instruments, all of which contributed 
to its demise (SARB, 2016b). This failure can be linked back to non-compliance (see 
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section 2.3) where the difference between compliance and non-compliance was 
explained. Furthermore, Lu and Mande (2014) note that non-compliance with the FASB 
will result in bank failure (section 2.3.1). 
In light of the above, there were clear deficiencies in complying with the following 
compliance requirements, namely, the Banks Act 94 of 1990, King III, NCA, NCR and 
BSD. The SARB also failed to supervise African Bank (see section 2.9). The disclosures 
of the board complying with applicable laws and regulations are therefore questionable 
because they are not as accurate as they could have been. 
4.4.4  Checklist Requirement 4: Acting in the best interests of the organisation 
Deloitte (2013) maintains that the board and its directors must act in the best interests of 
the organisation. The Act makes no distinction between executive, non-executive or 
independent non-executive directors; all directors are compelled to sign a declaration of 
interest and act in the best interests of the organisation (Schoeman, 2013). The Act and 
the JSE listing requirements emphasise the importance of the declaration of interest in 
order to hold directors personally liable for misconduct. The Act codifies the standard of 
a director’s conduct in terms of section 76, which clearly states that if the organisation 
suffers loss or damage as a result of directors not meeting the prescribed standard, it will 
result in personal liability of directors (see sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3) (Deloitte, 2014).  
According to IoDSA (2009), the interpretation of acting in the best interests of the 
organisation is as follows: 
▪ Each decision taken on behalf of the organisation should be intellectually honest, 
based on facts and be objective; 
▪ The appointment of directors should be in terms of the organisational constitution 
and the Act; and 
▪  Directors have the duty of exercising a degree of care, skill and diligence. 
According to African Bank’s integrated annual report, the bank disclosed this fourth 
requirement. However, there are contradictory results in the empirical of various scholars 
such as Nicholson and Kiel (2007), Carretta et al. (2010), Moyo (2010), Okaro et al. 
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(2015), Mupangavanhu (2017), Singh (2014), Kouki and Guizani (2015), Krishnan et al. 
(2017) and Stevens (2017). The above scholars concur that when acting in the best 
interests of the organisation, there should be transparency which should be observable 
to outsiders (see section 2.9). Directors should have appropriate knowledge, skills, 
experience, qualifications, and they should be free of any conflict of interest. The 
declaration of interest clearly states that should liabilities arise due to the negligence of 
directors; the directors should be held accountable for misconduct (see section 2.3.2).  
In the case of African Bank, the BoD signed a declaration of interest, and they were not 
held accountable for financial losses (SARB, 2016b). The BoD failed to comply with the 
JSE listing requirements and the Act insofar as these require all directors to sign a 
declaration of interest for accountability, as part of the compliance function to ensure 
transparency, responsibility and accountability for directors to act in good faith and not for 
personal gain. In which case, according to the Act, there are enforcement measures that 
hold directors personally liable when they act in contravention of this Act.  
In light of the above, the disclosure of African Bank was not accurate because the 
disclosure does not mirror the reality, because the BoD failed to act in the best interests 
of the bank. 
4.4.5 Checklist Requirement 5: Separation of the role of CEO and chairman 
The separation of the roles of CEO and chairman was discussed in section 2.4.7. Deloitte 
(2013), Henman (2013), Larker and Tayan (2016) define this separation as follows: the 
running of the board is the responsibility of the chairman, while the CEO is responsible 
for running the organisation by delegating authority to senior managers. 
For African Bank to show that it had fully disclosed the fifth requirement, it needed to 
show that there had been a separation of duties between the chairman, who was an 
independent, non-executive director, and the CEO, who should not have been fulfilling 
the role of chairman. Organisations should, therefore, state whether they complied with 
the following requirements (IoDSA, 2009): 
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▪ The chairman should be an independent, non-executive director who can provide 
the necessary direction for an effective board, and who is selected by board 
members; 
▪ There must be a formalised charter that defines the chairman’s role and functions;  
▪ There should be meetings between the chairman, CEO, CFO or the company 
secretary to discuss important issues and to agree on an agenda before a board 
meeting; and 
▪ In cases where the chairman is also the CEO or an executive, a lead non-executive 
director should be appointed.  
According to its 2014 integrated annual report, African Bank disclosed this requirement 
that there was a separation of CEO and the chairman’s role only. At the time of publication 
of the report, the bank did not have a CEO (African Bank, 2014). According to the IoDSA 
(2009) and the JSE listing requirements, should there be a removal or resignation of a 
director, full disclosure should be provided, stating the reason for removal or resignation 
(see section 2.7). African Bank failed to make full disclosure regarding the resignation of 
the CEO, and the BoD also failed to disclose who was acting as CEO.  
In conclusion, the board failed to disclose or explain on who was acting as CEO, therefore 
the disclosure is questionable with regard to this requirement.  
4.4.6 Checklist Requirement 6: Composition of the board 
Davies (2000) notes that rules relating to the composition of the board structure are to 
address agency problems, which arise between management, directors and 
shareholders. The board composition should comprise a majority of non-executive 
directors and fewer executive directors to balance the power and authority on the board 
(Muchemwa et al., 2016). The aim is to ensure independence and to minimise conflict by 
promoting objectivity. In the literature review, the composition of the board was discussed 
in detail, and it was pointed out that when appointing executive or non-executive directors, 
the candidates should possess a mixture of skills, experience and knowledge as befitting 
the position of director (see section 2.4.4 for executive directors and section 2.4.5 for non-
executive directors).   
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Organisations are required to state one of the following in their integrated annual report 
to comply with the requirements (IoDSA, 2009): 
▪ The board reflects a balance of power, with a majority of non-executive directors. 
▪ The majority of non-executive directors is independent. 
According to African Bank’s 2014 integrated annual report, the board consisted of eight 
directors, of which one was executive, and seven were non-executive. Although African 
Bank did disclose this requirement, this disclosure did not mirror the reality of the bank. 
The integrated annual report revealed that African Bank did not have a CEO, who 
resigned, and the reason for resignation was not disclosed. This represents non-
compliance with the requirement of full disclosure of why the CEO resigned and who was 
acting on his or her behalf. 
According to the SARB (2016b), the BoD did not possess the necessary skills, knowledge 
or experience to be appointed as directors, and this had a negative impact on the 
performance of the organisation. Positive performance can be maintained when the board 
possesses the appropriate skills, knowledge and experience, as this forms part of 
requirements of appointing the board (see sections 2.4.4 and 2.4.5). This is confirmed by 
scholars such as Adam and Mehran (2012), Kouki and Guizani (2015) and Shrivastav 
and Kalsie (2015), who examined the relationship between the bank's performance and 
board composition using the same variables. They found that there is a positive 
relationship between a bank’s performance and its board composition. Therefore, the 
board of African Bank failed to follow a formal process for its board composition in terms 
of the Act, the JSE listing requirements and King III.  
The Banks Act states that for a candidate to be appointed as director of a bank, they 
should have a sound understanding of banks; all directors should perform their duties 
with due diligence and care with a degree of competence as could be expected of a 
person holding a similar directorship position (SARB, 2016a). 
Adam (2012) and Iturralde et al. (2016) conclude that financial organisations need to 
consider a majority of independent directors who have the necessary skills, knowledge, 
qualification and experience when appointing directors in order to avoid a financial crisis. 
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Doorga (n.d.) and PwC (2013) conclude that the blame for the financial crisis should be 
placed on the board, and particularly, the non-executive directors because their duties 
are to monitor the activities of the organisation and prevent it from taking extreme risks. 
According to the SARB (2016b), the executives were asked to write an affidavit and state 
the knowledge, skills and qualifications they were required to possess to be appointed as 
directors of the bank. The non-executive directors were asked to write affidavits and state 
the following; knowledge and skills they possess to be appointed as directors, and what 
banking experience they possessed. Two executive directors stated that they did not have 
technical banking experience on the affidavit. Five non-executive director’s had no 
banking experience, and the qualification was not relevant; one had a relevant 
qualification but no experience. Another non-executive director failed to provide the 
investigator with any affidavit (SARB, 2016b). 
African Bank showed that it had fully disclosed the fifth requirement. However, based on 
the literature and the SARB (2016b), a conclusion can be made that African Bank’s 
disclosure was not accurate. 
4.4.7 Checklist Requirement 7: Appointment of directors through a formal process 
It is the duty of the board to ensure that candidates are competent to fulfil the position of 
director and to contribute to business decisions made by the board (IoDSA, 2009). 
Directors should be appointed based on the following: needs analysis, profile, search, 
selection, nomination and appointment (Mauritius Institute of Directors, 2012). The 
purpose of following a formal process is to ensure that: 
▪ Candidates have the skills and competencies that are needed by the organisation. 
▪ Candidates have integrity.  
▪ Candidates’ qualifications and experience are relevant to the directorship position 
(see sections 2.4.4 and 2.4.5). 
▪ There is a formalised agreement between the candidate and the organisation (see 
sections 2.4.4, 2.4.4 and 2.4.7). 
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African Bank disclosed this requirement in the integrated annual reporting. However, the 
disclosure was not accurate for this requirement for the following reasons. One of the 
formal requirements of appointing a director is that directors should have diverse skills 
and competencies needed by the organisation.  According to the Act and the JSE listing 
requirements, directors are expected to sign a formalised agreement as well as a 
declaration that binds directors to in terms of the Act.  
According to the Act, directors must act in the best interests of the organisation. The 
directors of African Bank failed to demonstrate transparency when acting on behalf of the 
bank because some executive members did not have the necessary knowledge and skills 
for a directorship position and a formal process was not followed when appointing them 
(SARB, 2016b).  
The Act stipulates that the board must have the necessary skills, knowledge and be 
independent before serving as director. The independence, necessary skills and 
qualifications of directors were compromised because they failed to advise the bank in 
terms of governance. Section 77(2) of the Act states that liabilities can be claimed from 
directors should there be any losses suffered by an organisation resulting from a director. 
This supported by Moyo (2010), Singh (2014), Stevens and Beer (2016) and Stevens 
(2017). The SARB (2016) concurs that the composition of the board was not appropriate, 
with some directors lacking experience in the financial services industry (see section 
4.3.6). 
It can, therefore, be concluded that African Bank’s disclosure was not accurate. 
4.4.8  Checklist Requirement 8: Induction of directors through a formal process 
The purpose of providing induction and ongoing training and development for directors 
through a formal process is to familiarise them with organisational operations (IoDSA, 
2011). The Act and the JSE listing requirements affirm that it is mandatory for directors 
to sign a declaration of interest, which is a contract between a director and the 
organisation, making the directors aware of what is expected of them and to achieve the 
following objectives: 
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▪ To ensure directors make informed decisions when acting on behalf of the 
organisation; 
▪ To familiarise directors with their rights, duties and function; 
▪ To ensure that any misrepresentations result in personal liability; and 
▪ To ensure that directors attain a level of understanding of business operations and 
industry. 
African Bank disclosed this requirement in the integrated annual reporting (African Bank, 
2014). However, evidence from the literature review indicates that directors must attain 
the highest possible level of understanding of business operations and, should they 
misrepresent the organisation, personal liability may arise. 
Despite disclosure of this requirement, the bank still failed, for the following reasons. The 
formal induction of directors was not properly conducted, which led directors failing to 
discharge their duties and ensuring independence.  The board failed to monitor the 
activities of the directors, nor did it make recommendations for the continuous 
professional development programme for directors to equip them with the requisite skills 
(SARB, 2016b). 
According to Act, it is the duty of the board to provide the directors of the organisation 
with proper guidance as to their duties, responsibilities and powers. The board should 
also assist in the proper induction, assessment of the specific training needs of directors 
and the provision of their ongoing training and education in order to achieve the objectives 
of the organisation (IoDSA, 2013). In light of the above, the board and its directors failed 
to discharge their responsibilities and thus contributed to the failure of the bank. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the disclosure of African Bank does not mirror a true 
reflection of the bank because its directors were not properly inducted, there was no 
continuous professional development, and the board failed to monitor the activities of 
directors. 
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4.4.9  Checklist Requirement 9: Evaluation and performance of the directors and 
the chairman 
The evaluation of the board, its committees and individual directors, should be performed 
every year by the chairman of the board to ensure the independence of the directors (see 
section 2.4.3). Deloitte (2014) points out that the evaluation of directors and the chairman 
should be performed on a yearly basis and this evaluation differs from organisation to 
organisation. The evaluation can be done in-house or by an independent service provider. 
The aim of this evaluation is to ensure directors perform their duties with honesty and act 
in the best interests of the organisation as discussed in Section 2.3.2 of Chapter 2. The 
IoDSA (2009) notes the following requirements when evaluating directors and the 
chairman 
▪ The contribution of the director should be evaluated against his or her duties, as 
per the contract between the director and the organisation; 
▪ The evaluation report should be disclosed and reported in full to the board; 
▪ Directors should be given a form to evaluate themselves and the performance of 
the chairman; 
▪ The performance evaluation of the CEO and executive directors can be conducted 
by an independent service provider or the chairman; and 
▪ The performance of the chairman should be evaluated by the board as a whole 
under the guidance of the lead independent director. 
African Bank did disclose the requirement of evaluating its non-executive directors, 
executive directors and chairman, although this disclosure is questionable because it 
does not reflect the reality for the following reasons:  
▪ Three of the non-executive directors did not possess the relevant skills, knowledge 
and experience to be appointed as directors of the bank; 
▪ Two of the executive directors did not have relevant skills or knowledge to be 
appointed as board members;  
▪ Therefore, the board failed to exercise the necessary skills and due diligence on 
the evaluation of directors;  
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▪ The assumption can be made that there was no evaluation of directors − had they 
have been evaluated, necessary training would have been recommended for those 
who did not possess the right mixture of skills, knowledge and experience; and  
▪ The purpose of the evaluation is to ensure that directors discharge their duties with 
honesty and act as required by the Act. 
In light of the above, the disclosure of African Bank was not accurate. 
4.4.10  Analysis of the overall compliance of African Bank 
The literature review discussed the benefits of governance and compliance as a 
component of governance. Organisations that disclose governance requirements comply 
with King III recommendations. 
The analysis of results, as shown in Table 4.1, indicates that African Bank did indeed 
comply with the King III principles and recommendations. African Bank followed a 
checklist approach when it came to governance disclosures. If one looked at the 
disclosure that the bank should have made in terms of King III, it would seem that the 
bank was compliant. However, upon deeper investigation, it became evident that     
African Bank was superficial in its disclosures, and the BoD was not transparent enough 
about the operations of the bank. A casual reader of the integrated annual report would 
therefore not have been able to pick up that there were problems in this organisation 
based on the selective disclosure provided.  
4.5 Conclusion 
This Chapter analysed the level to which African Bank complied with the governance 
disclosure requirements of King III. The governance disclosure framework, empirical 
study and research results were discussed in this Chapter. 
In order to analyse the governance disclosures of African Bank, a self-developed checklist 
was used, which was formulated based on the King III principles and recommendations. 
The King III, SARB report and the African Bank integrated annual report, was measured 
against a self-developed checklist of recommendations based on King III. 
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After analysing the 2014 integrated annual report, it was found that African Bank did fully 
comply with governance disclosure in terms of the King III principles and 
recommendations; however, these disclosures were questionable and inaccurate. The 
SARB also failed to provide banking supervision and regulation to this bank, as required 
by the Banks Act. Despite meeting the minimum requirements of King III disclosures, 
African Bank failed.  
Checklist Requirement 1: The first requirement states that it is the board’s responsibility 
to provide effective leadership based on an ethical foundation. The CEO of the bank was 
singlehandedly, making decisions about the bank on behalf of the board. The BoD failed 
to explain in terms of King III, how it was ensuring good leadership. The board failed to 
exercise the necessary care, skill and diligence, and consequently, a penalty was 
imposed by the NCR as a result of inadequate practices. The board failed to act ethically 
by allowing the bank to charge interest above the benchmark. The bank failed to diversify 
its products, continuing with unsecured loans.   
Checklist Requirement 2: This requirement refers to the board, acting as the custodian 
of corporate governance. The board failed to effectively control and monitor corporate 
governance, and as a result, this led to the poor performance of the bank. The board did 
not comply with the Act or the JSE listing requirements when appointing directors. 
Directors of the bank did not act in terms of the Act, as mandated by the Act. The BoD 
failed to demonstrate the characteristics of good corporate governance, namely, fairness, 
accountability, responsibility and transparency (see section 2.3.4). 
Checklist Requirement 3: This requirement states that the organisation should comply 
with applicable laws and regulations. The board of African Bank failed to comply with the 
following compliance requirements: The Banks Act, NCA, NCR and the JSE listing 
requirements and King III recommendations. The directors discharged their duties and 
responsibilities poorly due to a lack of experience in the financial services sector. They, 
therefore, failed to act in the best interests of the bank. Consequently, the bank did not 
comply with the compliance framework. 
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Checklist Requirement 4: This requirement states that directors should act in the best 
interests of the organisation. The African Bank directors failed to comply with this 
disclosure requirement because they did not act in the best interests of the bank. This 
was because they had limited experience in the financial services industry. According to 
the Act and the JSE listing requirements, candidates should possess relevant skills, 
knowledge and experience to be appointed as directors. The SARB indicates that the 
bank’s directors were asked to write an affidavit regarding their experience, skills and 
qualifications; about five directors, both executive and non-executive, did not to comply 
with this requirement. As a result, the board failed to demonstrate transparency, 
responsibility and accountability. The board also failed to act in the best interests of the 
organisation. Moreover, the directors were not held responsible for any misconduct 
resulting in financial losses as the board failed to enforce measures that would hold 
directors personally liable. 
Checklist Requirement 5: The fifth requirement refers to the board electing a chairman 
who is not the CEO of the organisation. According to African Bank’s integrated annual 
report 2014, the bank did not have a CEO at the time; therefore, it failed to make full 
disclosure about the resignation of the CEO. Consequently, African Bank failed to comply 
with this disclosure requirement as the board neglected the principle of ‘apply or explain’ 
in terms of King III. 
Checklist Requirement 6: This requirement states that the board should maintain a 
balance of power, with a majority of non-executive independent directors. The board 
composition was inappropriate at African Bank because two executive and three non-
executive directors did not possess the appropriate skills, knowledge or experience for a 
directorship position. The board also failed to comply with the Act and the JSE listing 
requirements in terms of appointing a director. Moreover, proper induction and continuous 
professional development programmes were not provided to directors. It can, therefore, 
be concluded that African Bank failed to comply with this disclosure requirement. 
 
Checklist Requirement 7: this requires the board to follow a formal process when 
appointing directors. A formal process was not followed by appointing directors at African 
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Bank. The board failed to consider the following when appointing directors: complying 
with the Act and the JSE listing requirements. 
 
Checklist Requirement 8: According to this requirement, the board needs to provide an 
induction to directors through a formal process. There was no formal process followed by 
the board in providing an induction to directors because directors failed to discharge their 
duties and responsibilities. The board also failed to equip directors with the necessary 
skills required for the organisation. The board failed to provide monitoring activities to 
directors and make recommendations for continuous development programme. The 
board failed to comply with the King III, which clearly states that the BoD should provide 
the directors of the organisation with proper guidance in discharging their duties and 
responsibilities.  
 
Checklist Requirement 9: This requires an evaluation and performance of the directors 
and the chairman. The bank failed to provide evaluation and performance of directors, 
which eventually contributed to the downfall of the bank. The evaluation and rotation of 
board members were not done; otherwise the recommendation of the board members 
who had little knowledge of the financial services industry would have been identified.  
 
The above discussion highlights the importance of ensuring that disclosure mirrors the 
reality of the organisation. African Bank made the minimum disclosures as recommended 
by King III; however, in reality, these were not completely accurate reflections of what 
was actually taking place at African Bank. This lack of transparency resulted in a distorted 
picture of African Bank being portrayed in the integrated annual report to the stakeholders 
of the entity. This is because the disclosure met the minimum disclosure requirements at 
a superficial level, showing the entity to be in compliance with good governance 
recommendations and requirements, yet only months later, African Bank was placed 
under curatorship. 
 
Chapter 5 provides a summary of the findings, recommendations and a discussion of 
future research. 
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CHAPTER 5: Summary, Conclusion and 
Recommendations 
 
5.1  Introduction 
This Chapter presents a summary of the study, draws conclusions and presents 
recommendations for future research.  
The study has analysed the governance disclosures in the banking sector, based on a 
case study of African Bank. The specific objectives of this study were first, to critically 
evaluate the governance disclosure framework requirements for organisations in South 
Africa. The second objective was to critically evaluate the compliance requirements 
framework for organisations in South Africa. The final objective was to analyse the 
governance disclosures by African Bank against the governance disclosure framework 
and compliance framework requirements. The study emphasised the importance of the 
governance disclosures in the banking sector using the King III principles and 
recommendations. The analysis was done by comparing disclosures in the integrated 
annual report of African Bank to recommendations of King III regarding certain 
disclosures that entities are encouraged to make. 
The research objectives were achieved by obtaining relevant data through a literature 
review. The data was analysed through content analysis. The following sections 
presented the findings of the literature review conducted in Chapter 2 and the empirical 
study conducted in Chapter 4.  
The literature review indicates that governance disclosure plays an important role in 
assessing an organisation’s business performance, and the director’s performance using 
the governance process, which all combine to drive corporate governance, and helps 
organisations to achieve strategic objectives. Compliance assures that the organisation’s 
internal and external controls have been followed and comply with the laws and 
regulations of regulatory bodies, industry mandates and internal policies. This can be 
achieved by complying with the King III principles and recommendations. 
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The findings from the literature review revealed that: 
▪ The proper implementation of good governance requires a balance of power 
among the board members. 
▪ The BoD is accountable to stakeholders for ensuring reporting structures of the 
organisation as a whole and proper governance disclosure.  
▪ The board is also responsible for accountability, responsibility, transparency and 
fairness.  
▪ Good governance encourages goodwill, creates confidence in financial 
performance and maximises the profitability of the organisation. 
▪ Compliance is a component of governance that ensures organisations abide by 
applicable codes, laws, regulations and standards. There is a need for a formalised 
compliance framework to be in place. 
▪ Formal procedures to appoint executive and non-executive directors must be 
followed, and candidates must possess skills, knowledge and industry experience. 
▪ Organisations that are listed on the JSE must apply the King III principles and 
recommendations, or they must explain by providing reasons for non-compliance. 
▪ The Act and the JSE requirements emphasise that directors should sign a 
declaration of interest, stating that they are free from conflict of interest and act in 
terms of the Act. 
The empirical study found that: 
The BoD of African Bank did not fully comply with the following requirements in terms of 
the King III principles and recommendations, based on the checklist. The bank did, 
however, disclose that it complied with the following. 
▪ The board's responsibility in providing effective leadership based on an ethical 
foundation; 
▪ The board acts as custodian of corporate governance; 
▪ Compliance with applicable laws and regulations; 
▪ Acting in the best interests of the organisation; 
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▪ Separating the roles of the CEO and chairman; 
▪ The composition of the board; 
▪ The appointment of directors through a formal process; 
▪ The induction of directors through a formal process; and 
▪ Evaluation and performance of directors and the chairman. 
5.2  Possibilities for future research 
This study identified problems encountered which may have led to African Bank’s failure. 
Proper governance practices were not in place. The bank’s failure was not due to 
disclosure requirements not being met but governance failures and non-compliance with 
the King III principles and recommendations.  
This study only examined governance disclosures. Other causes of African Bank’s failure 
could be investigated. Future studies could, therefore, increase the scope of the research 
as follows: 
▪ The formalisation of governance and compliance framework for the banking sector; 
▪ Pre- and post-analysis of African Bank, and comparing the results to establish 
reasons for the collapse; 
▪ To establish whether African Bank observed the regulatory framework and if so, 
why the bank failed; and 
▪ To analyse the governance disclosures of Venda Bank Society and determine the 
possible causes of failures of the bank. 
5.3  Conclusion 
The banking sector drives economic development in the country. It is, therefore important 
that it functions effectively and efficiently. This study analysed the governance disclosures 
of African Bank in terms of King III. It was found that there are a number of key risks 
evident in the example from African Bank, namely, non-executive directors failing to act 
as monitors of the bank and protecting shareholders from the personal interests of 
management; executive and non-executive directors having little knowledge of the 
financial services industry and lacking relevant skills, experience and qualifications. 
Therefore, the board of African Bank failed to act in the best interests of the organisation 
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by failing to appoint suitably qualified candidates. The board also failed to provide good 
corporate governance and monitor relationships between the board, management, the 
organisation and its stakeholders in terms of agency theory. Moreover, the SARB failed 
to monitor African Bank in terms of the Banks Act. African Bank, for its part, failed to 
comply with regulatory requirements such as the Act, the JSE listing requirements and 
King III.  
The Act, the JSE listing requirements and King III clearly state the requirements for 
appointing directors. In terms of the Banks Act, the SARB appoints the BSD to provide 
supervision to registered banks. The Act aims to enhance the bank's performance, to 
ensure the development and stability of the banking sector. The board failed to ensure 
the positive performance of the bank by failing to consider the legitimate interests and 
expectations of stakeholders; it also failed to exercise leadership, integrity and good 
judgement in leading the organisation. 
A qualitative research methodology was followed based on the use of primary data. 
Content analysis was applied to examine reports, documents and recorded information 
to establish governance disclosure in African Bank’s 2014 integrated annual report. 
The results of this study reflect that African Bank was not in compliance with the agency 
theory, which postulates that non-executive directors need to play a strong monitoring 
role to reduce agency costs. This could have led to better performance by the bank. The 
results also showed that the bank was not in line with dependence resource theory which 
postulates that the board should provide resources to minimise non-compliance issues 
between the organisation and the regulatory bodies. 
Based on the conceptual foundation derived from the literature review and the findings of 
the empirical study, a conclusion can be made that African Bank did not fully comply with 
the King III principles and recommendations, despite appearing to have provided full 
disclosure in its integrated annual report. The BoD failed to apply or explain in terms of 
the King III principle how it ensured responsibility for acting as custodian of corporate 
governance and providing ethical leadership. There is room for improvement in terms of 
the disclosure of governance of African Bank as the non-executive directors should have 
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ensured adequate governance structures existed within the bank to promote 
transparency. 
The BoD of African Bank failed to demonstrate transparency when conducting the 
activities of the organisation as the bank's disclosure of governance practices did not 
reflect the reality to outsiders. Transparency is one of the key components of corporate 
governance. The BoD failed to disclose information that was accurate, timely, relevant, 
honest, accessible and comparable with the past financial performance of the 
organisation. The BoD failed to make full disclosure on why the bank did not have a CEO. 
King III clearly states that, should there be any removal or resignation of the board 
member, full disclosure should be made in the integrated annual report. In a situation 
where the board decides not to apply a specific principle or recommendation, such 
information should be fully disclosed to the organisation’s stakeholders. 
Therefore, disclosure by entities must be transparent and robust; it should not follow a 
superficial ‘tick-box’ approach to meet the minimum disclosure requirements. Transparent 
disclosure is beneficial to all stakeholders, allowing them to make sound decisions based 
on reliable and accurate information. 
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